THE COMPLETE 9/11 TIMELINE, PART 1
By Paul Thompson
Other Sections of the
Timeline:
This
story is so complicated and long, I've tried to break it into threads of different
colors to make it easier to digest. I've made separate pages for each thread,
in addition to webpages with all the threads together.
Central Asian oil, Enron and the Afghanistan pipelines. For a
separate page of these entries only, click here.
Information that should have shown what kind of attack
al-Qaeda would make. For a separate page of these entries only, click here.
US preparing for a war with Afghanistan before 9/11,
increasing control of Asia before and since. For a separate page of these entries
only, click
here.
Incompetence, bad luck, and/or obstruction of justice. For a
separate page of these entries only, click here.
Suggestions of advanced knowledge that an attack would take
place on or around 9/11. For a separate page of these entries only, click here.
Cover-up, lies, and/or contradictions. For a
separate page of these entries only, click here.
Israeli "art student" spy ring, Israeli
foreknowledge evidence. For a separate page of these entries only, click here.
Anthrax attacks and microbiologist deaths. For a
separate page of these entries only, click here.
Pakistani ISI and/or opium drug connections. For a separate page of these entries only, click here.
Bin Laden family, Saudi Arabia corruption and support of
terrorists, connections to Bush. For a separate page of these entries
only, click
here.
Erosion of civil liberties and erection of a police
state. For a separate page of these entries only, click here.
Names/Abbreviations
For
simplicity's sake I don't always use the full names and jobs of some of the
major people or organizations in this story. For instance, every time I say
"bin Laden," I mean the terrorist Osama bin Laden, not one of his
family members. I have standardized the spellings of the Islamic names, even
within quotes. Al-Qaeda, for instance, can be spelled many ways, and the person
known as Saeed Sheikh has too many name variations and spelling variations to
count.
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Organizations: |
Important
individuals: |
The hijackers:
There are many spellings and aliases - the names and spellings below
are the versions preferred by the FBI. *= Some evidence suggests the identity
of this person may be incorrect (see September
16-23, 2001).
American Airlines Flight 11
Waleed
Alshehri, 22, from Saudi Arabia *
Wail
Alshehri, 28, from Saudi Arabia, brother of Waleed Alshehri, had
psychological problems *
Abdulaziz
Alomari, 22, from Saudi Arabia *
Satam Al
Suqami, 25, from Saudi Arabia
Mohamed
Atta, 33, from Egypt (the likely pilot) *
United Airlines Flight 93
Saeed
Alghamdi, 21, from Saudi Arabia (had flight training) *
Ahmed
Alhaznawi, 20, from Saudi Arabia *
Ahmed
Alnami, 23, from Saudi Arabia *
Ziad Jarrah,
26, from Lebanon (the likely pilot) *
United Airlines Flight 175
Ahmed
Alghamdi, 22, from Saudi Arabia
Hamza
Alghamdi, 20, from Saudi Arabia, brother of Ahmed Alghamdi *
Marwan
Alshehhi, 23, from United Arab Emirates (the likely pilot) *
Mohand
Alshehri, 22, from Saudi Arabia, possible cousin of Marwan Alshehhi and/or
from the same extended family as Wail and Waleed Alshehri
Fayez
Ahmed Banihammad (Alshehri), 24, from United Arab Emirates (had flight
training)
American Airlines Flight 77
Khalid
Almihdhar, 26, from Saudi Arabia (originally from Yemen, changed
citizenship in 1996) *
Nawaf
Alhazmi, 25, from Saudi Arabia
Salem
Alhazmi, 20, from Saudi Arabia, brother of Nawaf Alhazmi *
Hani
Hanjour, 29, from Saudi Arabia (the likely pilot)
Majed Moqed,
24, from Saudi Arabia *
December
26, 1979: Soviet forces invade Afghanistan. They will
withdraw in 1989 after a brutal 10-year war. It has been commonly believed that
the invasion was unprovoked. But in a 1998 interview, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, reveals that the CIA
began destabilizing the pro-Soviet Afghan government six months earlier, in a
deliberate attempt to get the Soviets to invade and have their own Vietnam-type
costly war: "What is most important to the history of the world? The
Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the
liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?" [Le
Nouvel Observateur, 1/98, Mirror,
1/29/02] The US and Saudi Arabia give a huge amount of
money (estimates range up to $40 billion total for the war) to support the
mujaheddin guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians. Most of the money is managed by the ISI, Pakistan's
intelligence agency. [Nation,
2/15/99]
Early 1980:
Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid
for the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, with the advice and
support of the Saudi royal family. [New Yorker,
11/5/01] Some believe he was hand-picked for
the job by Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi Arabia's secret service. [Sunday Times,
8/25/02] Bin Laden has been considered a Turki protégé by some biographers.
[New
Yorker, 11/5/01] The Pakistani ISI
wanted a Saudi prince as a public demonstration of the commitment of the Saudi
royal family and as a way to ensure royal funds for the anti-Soviet forces. The
agency failed to get royalty, but bin Laden, with his family's influential
ties, was good enough for the ISI. [Miami
Herald, 9/24/01]
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October
1980: Salem bin Laden, Osama's oldest brother, is later
described by a French secret intelligence report as one of the two closest
friends of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. As such, he often performs important
missions for Saudi Arabia. The French report speculates that he is involved in
secret Paris meetings between US and Iranian emissaries this month. Frontline,
which published the French report, notes that such meetings have never been
confirmed. Rumors of these meetings have been called the "October
Surprise" and some have speculated Bush Sr. negotiated in these meetings a
delay to the release of the US hostages in Iran, thus helping Ronald Reagan and
Bush win the 1980 Presidential election. All of this is highly speculative, but
if the French report is correct, it points to a long-standing connection of
highly illegal behavior between the Bush and bin Laden families (see also Mid-1980s and 1988).
[PBS
Frontline, 2001]
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1982-1991: Afghan opium production skyrockets from 250 tons in 1982 to
2,000 tons in 1991, coinciding with CIA support and funding of the mujaheddin.
Alfred McCoy, a professor of Southeast Asian history at the University of
Wisconsin, says US and Pakistani intelligence officials sanctioned the rebels'
drug trafficking because of their fierce opposition to the Soviets: "If
their local allies were involved in narcotics trafficking, it didn't trouble
CIA. They were willing to keep working with people who were heavily involved in
narcotics." For instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a rebel leader who received
about half of all the CIA's covert weapons, was known to be a major heroin
trafficker. The director of the CIA in
Afghanistan claims later to be oblivious about the drug trade: "We found
out about it later on." [Minneapolis
Star-Tribune, 9/30/01, Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96]
1984: Bin Laden moves to Peshawar, a Pakistani town bordering
Afghanistan, and is running a front organization for the mujaheddin known as
Maktab al-Khidamar (MAK), funneling money, arms and fighters from the outside
world into the Afghan war. [New Yorker,
1/24/00] "MAK was nurtured by Pakistan's state security services, the
Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA's primary conduit for
conducting the covert war against Moscow's occupation." [MSNBC, 8/24/98] He
becomes closely tied to the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and greatly
strengthens Hekmatyar's opium smuggling operations. [Le Monde,
9/14/01] Hekmatyar had ties with bin Laden, the CIA and drug running, and
has also been called "an ISI stooge and creation" by the Wall Street
Journal. [Asia Times,
11/15/01]
1984-1994: The US, through USAID and the University of Nebraska, spends
millions of dollars developing and printing textbooks for Afghan
schoolchildren. The textbooks are filled with violent images and militant
Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to spur resistance to the Soviet
occupation. For instance, children are taught to count with illustrations
showing tanks, missiles and land mines. Lacking any alternative, millions of
these textbooks are used long after 1994; the Taliban are still using them in
2001. In 2002, the US started producing less violent versions of the same
books, which Bush says will have "respect for human dignity, instead of
indoctrinating students with fanaticism and bigotry." Bush fails to
mention who created those earlier books. [Washington
Post, 3/23/02, CBC,
5/6/02] Since the war with Russia ended
in 1989, why did the US keep promoting Islamic radicalism another five years?
Mid-1980s:
Salem bin Laden, Osama's oldest brother, is allegedly
involved in the Iran-Contra affair. Quoting a French intelligence report posted
by Frontline (see October
1980), The New Yorker reports, "During the nineteen-eighties,
when the Reagan Administration secretly arranged for an estimated thirty-four
million dollars to be funneled through Saudi Arabia to the Contras, in
Nicaragua, Salem bin Laden aided in this cause, according to French
intelligence." [New Yorker,
11/5/01, Frontline,
2001]
Mid-1980s (B): The ISI starts a special cell of agents who use profits from
heroin production for covert actions "at the insistence of the CIA."
"This cell promotes the cultivation of opium and the extraction of heroin
in Pakistani territory as well as in the Afghan territory under mujaheddin
control for being smuggled into the Soviet controlled areas, in order to turn
the Soviet troops heroin addicts. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops,
the ISI's heroin cell started using its network of refineries and smugglers for
smuggling heroin to the Western countries and using the money as a supplement
to its legitimate economy. But for these heroin dollars, Pakistan's legitimate
economy must have collapsed many years ago." [Financial
Times, Asian edition, 8/10/01] The ISI grows so powerful on this money,
that Time magazine later states, "Even by the shadowy standards of spy
agencies, the ISI is notorious. It is commonly branded 'a state within the
state,' or Pakistan's 'invisible government.'" [Time,
5/6/02]
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March
1985: The US decides to escalate the war in Afghanistan. The
CIA, British MI6 and the ISI agree to launch guerrilla attacks from Afghanistan
into then Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, attacking military
installations, factories and storage depots within Soviet territory until the
end of the war. The CIA also begins supporting the ISI in recruiting radical
Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan
mujaheddin. The CIA gives subversive literature and Korans to the ISI, who
carry them into the Soviet Union. Eventually, around
35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries will fight with the Afghan
mujaheddin. Tens of thousands more will study in the hundreds of new madrassas
funded by the ISI and CIA in Pakistan. Their main logistical base is in the
Pakistani city of Peshawar. [Washington Post,
7/19/92, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, 9/23/01, Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 9/23/01, The
Hindu, 9/27/01, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid, 3/01] In the late 1980s, Pakistan's President
Benazir Bhutto, feeling the mujaheddin network has grown too strong, tells
President George Bush Sr., "You are creating a Frankenstein." But the
warning goes unheeded. [Newsweek,
9/24/01] By 1993, the President
of Pakistan tells Egyptian President Hasni Mubarak that Peshawar is under de
facto control of the mujaheddin, and unsuccessfully asks for military help in
reasserting Pakistani control over the city. Thousands of mujaheddin fighters
return to their home countries after the war is over, and engage in countless
acts of terrorism. One Western diplomat notes these thousands would never have
been trained or united without US help, and says "The consequences for all
of us are astronomical." [Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96]
1986: The CIA, ISI and bin Laden work together to build the Khost
tunnel complex in Afghanistan. This will be a major target of bombing and
fighting in the US defeat of the Taliban in 2001. [Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, 9/23/01, Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 9/23/01, The
Hindu, 9/27/01, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid, 3/01] It is reported before 9/11 that "bin
Laden worked closely with Saudi, Pakistani and US intelligence services to
recruit mujaheddin from many Muslim countries," but this hasn't been
reported much since. [UPI,
6/14/01] A CIA spokesman will later claim,
"For the record, you should know that the CIA never employed, paid, or
maintained any relationship whatsoever with bin Laden." [Ananova,
10/31/01]
September
1987-March 1989: Michael Springmann, the head US
consular official in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, later claims that he is
"repeatedly told to issue visas to unqualified applicants." He turns
them down, but is repeatedly overruled by superiors. Springmann loudly
complains about the practice to numerous government offices, but no action is
taken. He eventually is fired and the files he has kept on these applicants are
destroyed. Springmann speculates that the issuing of visas to radical Islamic
fighters continued until 9/11. He says he later learns that recruits from many
countries fighting for bin Laden against Russia in Afghanistan were funneled
through the Jeddah office to get visas to come to the US. They would then train for the Afghan war in the US. He says the
Jeddah consulate was run by the CIA and staffed almost entirely by intelligence
agents. Springmann suggests that this visa system may have continued until
present day, and that the 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers getting their visas
through Jeddah (see May
21, 2002 (C)) could have been a part of it (see
also October 21, 2002 and October 23, 2002). [BBC,
11/6/01, AP,
7/17/02, Fox News,
7/18/02]
1988: Prior to this year, George Bush Jr. is a failed oil man.
Three times friends and investors have bailed him out to keep him from going
bankrupt. But in this year, the same year his father becomes President, some
Saudis buy a portion of his small company, Harken, which has never worked
outside of Texas. Later in the year, Harken wins a contract in the Persian
Gulf and starts doing well financially. These transactions seem so
suspicious that the Wall Street Journal in 1991 states it "raises the
question of ... an effort to cozy up to a presidential son." Two
major investors in Bush's company during this time are Salem bin Laden, Osama
bin Laden's oldest brother, and Khaled bin Mahfouz. [Salon,
11/19/01, Intelligence
Newsletter, 3/2/00] Khaled bin Mahfouz is a Saudi banker with a 20 percent
stake in BCCI, a bank that will go bankrupt a few years later in the biggest
corruption scandal in banking history (see July
5, 1991). In 1999 bin Mahfouz will be placed under house arrest
in Saudi Arabia for contributions he gave to welfare organizations closely
linked to bin Laden (see April 1999). Bin Mahfouz's sister
is married to Osama bin Laden (see also August
13, 1996, Early December 2001 (B), December
4, 2001 (B), and November 26, 2002). [Washington
Post, 2/17/02] In late 2002, Ron Motley, the lead lawyer in a 9/11 Saudi
suit (see August 15, 2002), threatens that
Bush, now President, "may find himself being deposed" in court for
these financial ties to bin Mahfouz. [Minneapolis Star
Tribune, 8/16/02]
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August 11, 1988: Bin Laden
forms al-Qaeda this year (notes are later found showing a meeting led by bin
Laden on this day discussing "the establishment of a new military
group"). [AP,
2/19/03]
August 12, 1988: The first media report appears about
Echelon, a high-tech global electronic surveillance network between the US,
Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Governments deny that Echelon
exists, but whistleblowers expose it. They claim it's being abused in many
ways, including to spy on politicians domestically. Echelon is capable of
"near total interception of international commercial and satellite
communications," including taps into transoceanic cables, but it is
"impossible for analysts to listen to all but a small fraction of the
billions of telephone calls, and other signals which might contain
'significant' information." [New
Statesman, 8/12/88] Understanding the information surveillance
capabilities of Echelon is vital to determining what should have been known
about 9/11.
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1989-May 2000: Nabil
al-Marabh moves to Boston in 1989 and apparently lives there as a taxi driver
and al-Qaeda sleeper agent for the next ten years. [New York Times,
9/18/01, Boston
Herald, 9/19/01] In 1992 he learns to use weapons in an Afghan al-Qaeda
training camp with a terrorist named Raed Hijazi. [Chicago
Sun-Times, 9/5/02] He and Hijazi live together and drive taxis at the same
company in Boston for several years. [Los Angeles
Times, 9/21/01] A mutual friend at the same taxi company is later killed
participating in a 1999 al-Qaeda terrorist attack. [Boston
Herald, 9/19/01] Hijazi helps plan the USS Cole bombing (see October
12, 2000), and then participates in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel
in Jordan (see November 30, 1999). In May 1999,
the FBI approaches al-Marabh looking for Hijazi, but al-Marabh lies and says he
doesn't know Hijazi. [Washington
Post, 9/4/02] Hijazi is arrested in Syria in October 2000 and imprisoned in
Jordan for his bomb attempt there. [Toronto
Sun, 10/16/01] He begins to cooperate with investigators and identifies
al-Marabh as a US al-Qaeda operative. [New York Times,
9/18/01] Terrorist Ahmed Ressam (see December
14, 1999) gives evidence helping to prove that al-Marabh sent money
to Hijazi for the Jordan bombing. [Toronto
Sun, 11/16/01, ABC 7,
1/31/02] By February 1999, al-Marabh is driving taxis in Tampa, Florida
while maintaining a cover of living in Boston. [Toronto
Star, 10/26/01, ABC 7,
1/31/02] [New
York Times, 9/18/01] He apparently lives in Tampa at least part time until
February 200; investigators later wonder if he is an advance man for the
Florida-based hijackers. [New York Times, 9/18/01,
ABC 7,
1/31/02] Al-Marabh is living in Detroit by May 2000, though he maintains a
Boston address until September 2000 (see May
30, 2000-September 11, 2001).
[Boston
Herald, 9/19/01] These connections with Hijazi lead to a US Customs
investigation into al-Marabh in early 2001 that connects him with two of the
9/11 hijackers (see Spring
2001 (B)). Yet, despite all of these al-Qaeda
connections and more, the US later decides there is no evidence that al-Marabh
is a terrorist (see September
19, 2001-September 3, 2002).
January 20, 1989: George
Bush Sr. is inaugurated as US president, replacing Ronald Reagan. He remains
president until 1993 (see January 20, 1993). Many of the key
members in his government later have important positions again when his son
George Bush Jr. becomes president in 2001 (see January 21, 2001). For instance,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell later becomes Secretary of State,
and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney later becomes Vice President.
February 15, 1989: Soviet
forces withdraw from Afghanistan. Afghan Communists retain control of Kabul,
the capital, until April 1992. [Washington
Post, 7/19/92]
November
9, 1989: The Berlin Wall begins to fall in East Germany,
signifying the end of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Just six days later, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin
Powell presents a new strategy document to President Bush Sr., proposing that
the US shift from countering Soviet attempts at world dominance to ensuring US
world dominance. Bush Sr. accepts this plan in a public speech, with slight
modifications, on August 2, 1990, the same day Iraq begins invading Kuwait. In
early 1992, Powell, counter to his usual public dove persona, tells congresspeople
that the US requires "sufficient power" to "deter any challenger
from ever dreaming of challenging us on the world stage." He says, "I
want to be the bully on the block." Powell's early ideas of global
hegemony will be formalized by others in a 1992 policy document (see March 8, 1992) and finally
realized as policy when Bush Jr. becomes president in 2001. [Harper's,
10/02]
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1990: Hani
Hanjour enters the US, the first of the hijackers to do so. He takes an English
course in Tuscon, Arizona. [Time,
9/24/01, Cox News,
10/15/01, New
York Times, 6/19/02] However, the FBI claims Hanjour first
arrived on October 3, 1991. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02]
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July
1990: Despite being on a terrorist watch list, radical Muslim
leader Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman enters the US on a "much-disputed"
tourist visa issued by an undercover CIA agent. [Village
Voice, 3/30/93, Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96] Abdul-Rahman was heavily involved with the CIA and ISI
efforts to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, and became famous traveling all
over the world for five years recruiting new mujaheddin. But he never hid his
prime goals, which were to overthrow the governments of the US and Egypt. [Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96] He is "infamous throughout the Arab world for his
alleged role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat."
Abdul-Rahman immediately begins setting up a terrorist network in the US. [Village
Voice, 3/30/93] He is known to have befriended bin Laden while in
Afghanistan, and bin Laden secretly pays Abdul-Rahman's US living expenses. [Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96, ABC
News, 8/16/02] Abdul-Rahman's ties to the assassination of Rabbi Meir
Kahane in later 1990 is ignored (see November
5, 1990). As one FBI agent says in 1993, he is "hands-off....
It was no accident that the sheikh got a visa and that he's still in the
country. He's here under the banner of national security, the State Department,
the NSA, and the CIA." A very high-ranking Egyptian official says
Abdul-Rahman continues to assist the CIA in recruiting new mujaheddin after
moving to the US. This official says, "We begged America not to coddle the
sheikh." Egyptian intelligence warns the US that Abdul-Rahman is planning
new terrorist attacks, and on November 12, 1992, terrorists connected to him
machine-gun a busload of Western tourists in Egypt. But still he lives freely
in New York City. [Village
Voice, 3/30/93] He is finally arrested in 1993 and convicted for assisting
in the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993). [Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96]
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November 5,
1990: An Egyptian American named El Sayyid Nosair assassinates
controversial right-wing Zionist leader Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane's
organization, the Jewish Defense League, was linked to dozens of bombings and
was ranked by the FBI as the most lethal domestic terrorist group in the US at
the time. Nosair is captured after a police shoot-out. An FBI informant says he saw Nosair meeting with Muslim leader
Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman a few days before the attack (see July 1990), and possessions
indicating a wider plot with additional targets are found. [Village
Voice, 3/30/93] Incredibly, files found in his possession which give
details of a terrorist cell, mention al-Qaeda, and discuss the destruction of
tall US buildings, are not translated until years later. [ABC
News, 8/16/02] Instead, within 12 hours of the assassination, New York
police declare the assassination was the work of a "lone gunman" and
they stick with that story. In his trial, prosecutors choose not to introduce
his incriminating possessions as evidence, nor is his confession even
mentioned, and an apparent "open-and-shut case" ends with his
acquittal. However, he is sentenced to 22 years on other lesser charges. [Village
Voice, 3/30/93] Bin Laden contributes to Nosair's defense fund. Many of
those involved in Kahane's assassination later plan the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993). As one FBI
agent puts it, "The fact is that in 1990, myself and my detectives, we had
in our office in handcuffs, the people who blew up the World Trade Center in
'93.… We were told to release them." [ABC
News, 8/16/02]
1991: Future National Security Advisor Rice joins Chevron's
board of directors, and works with Chevron until being picked as Bush's
National Security Advisor in 2001. Chevron even names an oil tanker after her.
Rice is hired for her expertise in Central Asia, and much of her job is spent
arranging oil deals in the Central Asian region. Chevron also has massive
investments there, which grow through the 1990s. [Salon,
11/19/01]
1991 (B): Bin Laden, having returned from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia and
the family business in 1989, moves to Sudan. With a personal fortune of around
$250 million (estimates range from $50 to $800 million [Miami
Herald, 9/24/01]), he begins plotting terrorist attacks against the US. [New Yorker,
1/24/00]
1991-1995: According to a Dutch government report, the US military
secretly breaks a United Nations arms embargo during the 1991-1995 Yugoslavia
war by channeling arms through radical Muslim groups in an
"Iran-Contra-style operation." US, Turkish and Iranian intelligence
groups work with radical Muslims in what the Dutch report calls the
"Croatian pipeline." Arms bought by Iran and Turkey and financed by
Saudi Arabia are flown into Croatia. Mujaheddin fighters are also flown in. The
US is "very closely involved" in the flagrant breach of the embargo,
an embargo the US is in charge of monitoring. [Guardian,
4/22/02] Could bin Laden have had a secret deal with the US to jointly
support the Bosnian Muslims, and in return the US didn't try to catch bin
Laden? If so, did it last after 1995?
1991-1997: The Soviet Union collapses in 1991, creating many new
nations in Central Asia. Major US oil companies, including ExxonMobil, Texaco,
Unocal, BP Amoco, Shell and Enron, directly invest billions in these Central
Asian nations, bribing heads of state to secure equity rights in the huge oil
reserves in these regions. The oil companies commit to future direct
investments in Kazakhstan of $35 billion. These companies face the problem
however of having to pay exorbitant prices to Russia to use Russian pipelines
to get the oil out. These oil fields have an estimated $6 trillion
potential value. US companies own approximately 75% of the rights. [New Yorker, 7/9/01, Asia Times, 1/26/02]
FTW
March 1991: Did
bin Laden ever truly break with the US and the CIA? The strongest motive that
he did comes from this time, which is also roughly when al-Qaeda first starts
targeting US interests. Although the Gulf War against Iraq just ended, the
US does not withdraw all of its soldiers from Saudi Arabia, but stations some
15,000-20,000 there permanently. [Nation,
2/15/99] In 1991, President Bush Sr. falsely
claims that all US troops have withdrawn. [Guardian,
12/21/01] Their presence isn't admitted until 1995, and there has never
been an official explanation as to why they are there. The
Nation postulates that they are there to prevent a coup. Saudi Arabia has an
incredible array of high-tech weaponry, but may lack the expertise to use it
and local soldiers may have conflicting loyalties. In 1998, bin Laden will
release a statement: "For more than seven years the United States has been
occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula,
plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people,
terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a
spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples." [Nation,
2/15/99]
July 5, 1991: The Bank
of England shuts down the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the
largest Muslim bank in the world. Based in Pakistan, this bank financed
numerous Muslim terrorist organizations and laundered money generated by
illicit drug trafficking and other illegal activities, including arms
trafficking. Bin Laden and many other terrorists had accounts there. [Detroit
News, 9/30/01] One money-laundering expert claims, "BCCI did dirty
work for every major terrorist service in the world." [Los
Angeles Times, 1/20/02] American and British governments knew about all
this yet kept the bank open for years. The ISI had major
connections to the bank. But, as later State Department reports indicate,
Pakistan remains a major drug trafficking and money-laundering center despite
the bank's closing. [Detroit
News, 9/30/01] The Washington Post claims, "The CIA used BCCI
to funnel millions of dollars to the fighters battling the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan." A French intelligence report later suggests the BCCI network
has been largely rebuilt by bin Laden (see October 2001). [Washington
Post, 2/17/02] The ruling family of Abu Dhabi, the dominant emirate in the
United Arab Emirates, owned 77 percent of the bank. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/20/02] A network of drug, weapons and money
laundering later develops between al-Qaeda, the Taliban, United Arab Emirates
and Pakistan (see Mid-1996-October 2001). Is the
ISI still connected to this ex-BCCI network? Is the CIA?
March
8, 1992: The Defense Planning Guidance,
"a blueprint for the department's spending priorities in the aftermath of
the first Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union," is leaked to the
New York Times. [New York Times,
3/8/92, Newsday,
3/16/03] The paper causes controversy, because it hadn't yet been
"scrubbed" to replace candid language with euphemisms. [New York Times,
3/10/92, New
York Times, 3/11/92, Observer, 4/7/02]
The document argues that the US dominates the world as sole superpower, and to
maintain that role it "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global
role." [New
York Times, 3/8/92, New York
Times, 3/8/92 (B)] As the Observer summarizes it, "America's friends
are potential enemies. They must be in a state of dependence and seek solutions
to their problems in Washington." [Observer, 4/7/02]
The document is mainly written by Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby, who hold
relatively low posts at the time, but under Bush Jr. become Deputy Defense
Secretary and Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, respectively. [Newsday,
3/16/03] The document conspicuously avoids mention of collective security
arrangements through the United Nations, instead suggesting the US "should
expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the
crisis being confronted." [New York Times,
3/8/92] It also calls for "punishing" or "threatening punishment"
against regional aggressors before they act. Interests to be defended
pre-emptively include "access to vital raw materials,
primarily Persian Gulf oil, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles, [and] threats to US citizens from
terrorism." [Harper's,
10/02] Senator Lincoln Chafee (R), later says, "It is my opinion that
[Bush Jr.'s] plan for preemptive strikes was formed back at the end of the
first Bush administration with that 1992 report." [Newsday,
3/16/03] In response to the controversy, in May 1992 the US releases an
updated version of the document that stresses the US will work with the United
Nations and its allies (see also January 1993). [Washington
Post, 5/24/92, Harper's,
10/02]
June 4, 1992: It is reported that the FBI is investigating the connections
between James Bath and George Bush Jr. Bath is Salem bin Laden's official
representative in the US. "Documents indicate that the Saudis were using
Bath and their huge financial resources to influence US policy," since
Bush Jr.'s father is president. Bush denies any connections to Saudi money. What
became of this investigation is unclear. [Houston
Chronicle, 6/4/92]
September
1, 1992: Terrorists Ahmad Ajaj and Ramzi
Yousef enter the US together. Ajaj is arrested at Kennedy Airport in New York
City. Ramzi Yousef is not arrested, and later masterminds the 1993 bombing of
the WTC (see February 26, 1993). "The US
government was pretty sure Ahmad Ajaj was a terrorist from the moment he
stepped foot on US soil," because his "suitcases were stuffed with
fake passports, fake IDs and a cheat sheet on how to lie to US immigration
inspectors," plus "two handwritten notebooks filled with bomb
recipes, six bomb-making manuals, four how-to videotapes concerning weaponry
and an advanced guide to surveillance training." However, Ajaj is only
charged with passport fraud, and serves a six-month sentence. From prison, Ajaj
frequently calls Ramzi Yousef and others in the WTC bombing plot, but no one
monitors or translates the calls until long after the bombing. [Los
Angeles Times, 10/14/01] An Israeli newsweekly later reports
that the Palestinian Ajaj may have been a mole for the Israeli Mossad. The
Village Voice has suggested that Ajaj may have had "advance knowledge of
the World Trade Center bombing, which he shared with Mossad, and that Mossad, for
whatever reason, kept the secret to itself." Ajaj was not just
knowledgeable, but was involved in the planning of the bombing from his prison
cell. [Village
Voice, 8/3/93] Ajaj is released from prison three days after the WTC
bombing, but is later rearrested and sentenced to more than
100 years in prison. [Los
Angeles Times, 10/14/01] One of the manuals seized from Ajaj is horribly
mistranslated for the trial. For instance, the title page is said to say
"The Basic Rule," published in 1982, when in fact the title says
"Al-Qaeda" (which means "the base" in English), published
in 1989. Investigators later complain that a proper translation could have
shown an early connection between al-Qaeda and the WTC bombing. [New
York Times, 1/14/01]
December 1992: A bomb
explodes in a hotel in Aden, Yemen, killing two tourists. US soldiers had just
left the hotel for Somalia. Intelligence agents suspect this may be the first
terrorist attack against the US connected to bin Laden. [Miami
Herald, 9/24/01]
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1993: Canadian police arrest Ali Mohamed, a high ranking al-Qaeda
figure. However, they release him when the FBI says he is a US agent. [Globe and
Mail, 11/22/01] Mohamed, a former US Army sergeant, then will continue to
work for al-Qaeda for a number of years. He trains bin Laden's personal
bodyguards and trains a terrorist cell in Kenya that later blows up the US
embassy there. Meanwhile, at least between 1993 and 1997 he tells secrets to
the FBI about al-Qaeda's operations. He is arrested in late 1998 and
subsequently convicted of his role in the 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya. [CNN, 10/30/98, Independent,
11/1/98] Says a former Egyptian intelligence officer: "For five years
he was moving back and forth between the US and Afghanistan. It's impossible
the CIA thought he was going there as a tourist. If the CIA hadn't caught on to
him, it should be dissolved and its budget used for something worthwhile."
[Wall
Street Journal, 11/26/01] Was Mohamed really playing the FBI and CIA for
fools, or was he a double agent inside al-Qaeda? If the latter, why couldn't
the US kill bin Laden in the 1990s if the head of his personal security was
secretly a US agent?
1993 (B): Bin Laden buys a jet from the US military in Arizona (the Pentagon
approved the transaction). This aircraft is later used to transport missiles
from Pakistan that kill American special forces in Somalia. He also has some of
his followers begin training as pilots in US flight schools. These initial
flight trainings come to nothing when details are later revealed in a court
case about Operation Bojinka (see January
6, 1995). [Sunday
Herald, 9/16/01]
1993 (C): An expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon postulates that an
airplane could be used as a missile to bomb national landmarks. But the panel
doesn't publish this idea in its report, Terror 2000. [Washington
Post, 10/2/01] One of the authors of the report
says. "We were told by the Department of Defense not to put it in... and I
said, 'It's unclassified, everything is available.' And they said, 'We don't
want it released, because you can't handle a crisis before it becomes a crisis.
And no one is going to believe you.'" [ABC
News, 2/20/02] However, in 1994 one of the panel's
experts will write in Futurist magazine: "Targets such as the World Trade
Center not only provide the requisite casualties but, because of their symbolic
nature, provide more bang for the buck. In order to maximize their odds for
success, terrorist groups will likely consider mounting multiple, simultaneous
operations with the aim of overtaxing a government's ability to respond, as
well as demonstrating their professionalism and reach." [Washington
Post, 10/2/01]
January
1993: In his last days in office as Defense Secretary, Dick
Cheney releases a document called Defense Strategy for the 1990s. It reasserts
the plans for US global domination outlined in an earlier Pentagon policy paper
(see March 8, 1992). [Harper's,
10/02] But because of Clinton's presidential victory, the implementation of
these plans will have to wait until Bush Jr. becomes president in 2001 and
Cheney becomes vice president. However, Cheney and others will continue to
refine this vision of global domination through the Project for the New
American Century think tank while they wait to reassume political power (see June
3, 1997 and September 2000).
January 20,
1993: Bill Clinton is inaugurated as president, replacing George Bush Sr.
He remains president until 2001 (see January 21, 2001).
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February
26, 1993: An attempt to blow up the WTC fails. Six
people are killed in the misfired blast. Analysts later determine that had
the terrorists not made a minor error in the placement of the bomb, both towers
could have fallen and up to 50,000 people could have been killed. The
attempt is organized by Ramzi Yousef, who has close ties to bin Laden. [Congressional
Hearings, 2/24/98] The New York Times later reports on
Emad Salem, an undercover agent who ends up being the key government witness in
the trial against the bomber. Salem testifies that the FBI knew about the
attack beforehand and told him they would thwart it by substituting a harmless
powder for the explosives. However, this plan was called off by an FBI
supervisor, and the bombing was not stopped. [New
York Times, 10/28/93] Why did the FBI seemingly let
the terrorists go ahead with the bombing? Others suspects are ineptly
investigated before the bombing (see July 1990 and November
5, 1990). Several of the bombers were trained by the CIA to fight in
the Afghan war, and the CIA later concludes in internal documents that it was
"partly culpable" for this bombing attempt. [Independent,
11/1/98] Ahmad Ajaj, an
associate of Yousef, may have been a mole for the Israeli Mossad, and the
Mossad may have had advanced knowledge of the bombing (see September 1, 1992). US officials later state that the overall mastermind of the 9/11
attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, is a close relative of Ramzi Yousef, [Independent,
6/6/02] probably his uncle. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] One of the attackers even left a message found by
investigators stating, "Next time, it will be very precise." 9/11 can
be seen as a completion of this failed attack. [AP,
9/30/01]
June
1993-October 1994: Saeed Sheikh, a brilliant British
student at the London School of Economics, drops out of school and moves to his
homeland of Pakistan to become a terrorist. Two months later, he begins
training in Afghanistan at camps run by al-Qaeda and the Pakistani army. By
mid-1994, he has become a terrorist instructor. In June 1994, he begins
kidnapping Western tourists in India. In October 1994, he is captured after
kidnapping three Britons and an American, and is put in a maximum-security
prison (see November 1994-December 1999). The ISI
pays for a lawyer to defend him. [Los
Angeles Times, 2/9/02, Daily
Mail, 7/16/02, Vanity
Fair, 8/02] His supervisor for his terror work is an ISI officer named Ijaz
Shah (see February
5, 2002). [Times
of India, 3/12/02, Guardian,
7/16/02] Al-Qaeda and the ISI later rescue him from prison (see December
24-31, 1999) and he becomes a
central figure in the financing of the 9/11 plot (see Early
August 2001 (D)).
October
3-4, 1993: Eighteen US soldiers are attacked and killed in
Mogadishu, Somalia, in a spontaneous gun battle (later the subject of the movie
Black Hawk Down). A 1998 US indictment charges bin Laden and his
followers with training the attackers. [PBS
Frontline, 10/3/02] The link between bin Laden and the
Somali killers of US soldiers appears to be Pakistani terrorist Maulana Masood
Azhar. [Los
Angeles Times, 2/25/02] Azhar is associated with Pakistan's ISI (see December
24-31, 1999), and the US has not publicly
complained that he is a free man in Pakistan (see December 14, 2002).
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November
1993: The Indian government gives approval for Enron's Dabhol
power plant, located near Bombay on the west coast of India. Enron has invested
$3 billion, the largest single foreign investment in India's
history. Enron owns 65 percent of Dabhol. This liquefied natural gas
powered plant is supposed to provide one-fifth of India's energy needs by
1997 [Asia Times,
1/81/01, Indian
Express, 2/27/00] It is the largest gas-fired power plant in the world.
Earlier in the year, the World Bank concludes that the plant is "not
economically viable" and refuses to invest in it. [New York Times,
3/20/01] Enron apparently tries to make the plant financially viable by
investing in gas fields in nearby Uzbekistan (see June
24, 1996), but it cannot get that gas to Dabhol without a gas
pipeline through Afghanistan (see June 24, 1996 and June 1998 (B)). Construction of
the plant is abandoned just before completion (see June 2001 (J)).
1994: Mohammed al-Khilewi, the First Secretary at the Saudi Mission
to the United Nations, defects and seeks political asylum in the US. He brings
with him 14,000 internal government documents depicting the Saudi royal
family's corruption, human-rights abuses, and financial support for terrorists.
He meets with two FBI agents and an Assistant US Attorney. "We gave them a sampling of the documents and put them on
the table," says his lawyer, "but the agents refused to accept
them." [New Yorker,
10/16/01] The documents include "details of the $7 billion the Saudis
gave to [Iraq leader] Saddam Hussein for his nuclear program -- the first
attempt to build an Islamic Bomb." But FBI agents were "ordered not
to accept evidence of Saudi criminal activity, even on US soil." [Best Democracy Money Can
Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03]
1994 (B): Coincidentally, three separate attacks this year involve hijacking
airplanes to crash them into buildings. A disgruntled Federal Express worker
tries to crash a DC-10 into a company building in Memphis but is overpowered by
the crew. A lone pilot crashes a small plane onto the White House grounds,
just missing the President's bedroom. An Air France flight is hijacked by
a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda, with the aim of crashing it into the
Eiffel Tower, but French Special Forces storm the plane before it takes
off. [New
York Times, 10/3/01]
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Early
1994-January 1995: 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed lives in
the Philippines for a year, planning the Bojinka plot until the plot is exposed
and he has to flee (see January
6, 1995). Police later say he lives a very expensive and non-religious
lifestyle. He meets in karaoke bars and go-go clubs, dates go-go dancers, stays
in four-star hotels, and takes scuba diving lessons. Once he rents a helicopter
just to fly it past the window of a girlfriend's office in an attempt to
impress her. This appears to be a pattern; for instance he has a big drinking
party in 1998. [Los Angeles
Times, 6/24/02] Officials believe his obvious access to large sums of money
indicate that some larger network is backing him by this time. [Los Angeles
Times, 6/6/02] It has been suggested that Mohammed,
a Pakistani, is able "to operate as he pleased in Pakistan" in the
1990s [Los
Angeles Times, 6/24/02], and even is linked to the Pakistani ISI (see June
4, 2002). Could the ISI be backing him at this early date? His
hedonistic time in the Philippines resembles reports of hijackers Mohamed Atta
and Marwan Alshehhi in the Philippines (see 1998-2000).
Mohammed returns to the Philippines occasionally, even being spotted there
after 9/11. [Knight
Ridder, 9/9/02] He almost gets caught while visiting an old girlfriend
there in 1999, and fails in a second plot to kill the Pope when the Pope
cancels his visit to the Philippines that year. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02, London
Times, 11/10/02] Does Mohammed meet the hijackers in the Philippines?
September
1994: Starting as Afghani exiles in Pakistan religious
schools, the Taliban begin their conquest of Afghanistan. [MSNBC, 10/2/01]
"The Taliban are widely alleged to be the creation of Pakistan's military
intelligence [the ISI]. Experts say that explains the Taliban's swift military
successes." [CNN,
10/5/96] Less often reported is that the CIA worked with the ISI to create
the Taliban. A long-time regional expert with extensive CIA ties says: "I
warned them that we were creating a monster." He adds that even years
later, "The Taliban are not just recruits from 'madrassas' (Muslim
theological schools) but are on the payroll of the ISI." [Times of India, 3/7/01]
The same claim is made on CNN in February 2002. [CNN, 2/27/02]
The Wall Street Journal will state in November 2001: "Despite their clean
chins and pressed uniforms, the ISI men are as deeply fundamentalist as any
bearded fanatic; the ISI created the Taliban as their own instrument and still
supports it." [Asia
Times, 11/15/01]
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November
1994-December 1999: Saeed Sheikh is imprisoned in India
for kidnapping Westerners (see June
1993-October 1994). While there, he meets another prisoner named
Aftab Ansari. Ansari, an Indian gangster, will be released on bail near the end
of 1999. [India
Today, 2/25/02] Saeed also meets another prisoner named Asif Raza Khan, who
also is released in 1999. [Rediff, 11/17/01]
After Saeed is rescued from prison (see December
24-31, 1999), he works with Ansari and Khan to kidnap Indians and
then uses some of the profits to fund the 9/11 attacks (see Early
August 2001 (D)). [Frontline, 2/2/02, India
Today, 2/14/02] Saeed also becomes good friends with prisoner Maulana
Masood Azhar, a terrorist with al-Qaeda connections (see October 3-4, 1993). [Sunday
Times, 4/21/02] Saeed will later commit further terrorist acts together
with Azhar's group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (see for instance October
1, 2001 (D) and December 13, 2001). [Independent, 2/26/02]
December 12, 1994: Terrorist Ramzi Yousef attempts a trial run of Operation Bojinka
(see January 6, 1995), planting a small
bomb on a Philippine Airlines flight to Tokyo (he gets off on a stopover before
the bomb is detonated). It explodes, killing one man, and would have caused the
plane to crash if not for what were described as heroic efforts by the pilot. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02, Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
1995: For the first time, though not the last, the
government of Sudan offers the US all of its files on bin Laden and
al-Qaeda. The US turns down the offer.
Bin Laden had been living in Sudan since 1991, because there were no visa
requirements to live there. Sudan was monitoring him, collecting a "vast
intelligence database on Osama bin Laden and more than 200 leading members of
his al-Qaeda terrorist network... [The US was] offered thick files, with
photographs and detailed biographies of many of his principal cadres, and vital
information about al-Qaeda's financial interests in many parts of the
globe." After 9/11, a US agent who has seen the files on bin Laden's
men in Khartoum says some were "an inch and a half thick." [Guardian,
9/30/01]
1995-2001: After the Taliban takes control of the area around Kandahar,
Afghanistan (see September 1994), prominent Persian
Gulf state officials and businessmen, including high-ranking UAE and Saudi
government ministers such as Saudi intelligence minister Prince Turki al-Faisal
(see July 1998), frequently secretly
fly into Kandahar on state and private jets for hunting expeditions. While there,
some develop ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda and give them money. Bin Laden
and Taliban leader Mullah Omar would sometimes participate in these hunting
trips. Former US and Afghan officials suspect that the dignitaries' outbound
jets may also have smuggled out al-Qaeda and Taliban cargo, just as smuggling
was rampant on other airplanes flying out of the country (see Mid-1996-October 2001). [Los
Angeles Times, 11/18/01]
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January 6,
1995: Philippine investigators uncover an al-Qaeda plot to
assassinate the Pope that would take place when he visits the Philippines one
week later. While investigating that, they also uncover Operation Bojinka,
planned by the same people: 1993 WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef (see February 26, 1993) and 9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see Early 1994-January 1995). [Independent,
6/6/02, Los Angeles
Times, 6/24/02, Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] FTW The plan is to explode 11 or 12 passenger planes over the Pacific
Ocean simultaneously. [Agence France
Presse, 12/8/01] If successful, up to 4,000 people would
have been killed in planes flying to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, and
New York. [Insight,
5/27/02] Operation Bojinka was scheduled to go forward just two weeks later
on January 21. Apparently a plan was also found for a second phase of attacks.
[The Cell, John Miller, Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, p. 124, Insight,
5/27/02] According to an investigator, in this phase, planes would be
hijacked and flown into "key structures in the United States. The World
Trade Center, the White House, the Pentagon, the Transamerican Tower, and the
Sears Tower were among the prominent structures that had been identified in the
plans that we had decoded." [Village
Voice, 9/26/01] One pilot, Abdul Hakim Murad, who learned to fly in US
flight schools, confesses that his role was to crash a plane into the CIA
headquarters as part of this phase of attacks. [Washington
Post, 9/23/01] An interrogation report from 1995 states: "[Murad] will
hijack said aircraft, control its cockpit and dive it at the CIA headquarters.
There will be no bomb or any explosive that he will use in its execution. It is
simply a suicidal mission that he is very much willing to execute." [Insight,
5/27/02] A Philippine investigator said on the day of 9/11: "It's
Bojinka." He later says: "We told the Americans everything about
Bojinka. Why didn't they pay attention?" [Washington
Post, 9/23/01] In an interview after 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will
claim that the 9/11 attacks were a refinement and resurrection of Bojinka. [Australian,
9/9/02]
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February 7, 1995: Terrorist
Ramzi Yousef is arrested in Pakistan (see February 26, 1993 and January 6, 1995). The next day, as
Yousef is flying over New York City on his way to a prison cell, an FBI agent
says to Yousef, "You see the Trade Centers down
there, they're still standing, aren't they?" Yousef responds, "They
wouldn't be if I had enough money and enough explosives." [MSNBC, 9/23/01,
The Cell, John Miller, Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, p. 135]
March 1995: Belgian
investigators find a CD-ROM of an al-Qaeda terrorist manual and begin
translating it a few months later. Versions of the manual circulate widely and
are seized by the police all over Europe. A former CIA official
claims the CIA does not obtain a copy of the manual until the end of 1999:
"The truth is, they missed for years the largest terrorist guide ever
written." He blames CIA reluctance to scrutinize its support for the
anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s (see December
26, 1979 and March
1985). The CIA claims that the manual isn't
that important, and that it had copies for years in any case (see also September 1, 1992). [New
York Times, 1/14/01, CBS, 2/20/02]
March 1995-February
1996: A man named Ziad Jarrah rents an apartment in Brooklyn, New York. [Among
the Heroes, Jere Longman, 2002, p. 90] The landlords later identify his
photograph as being that of the 9/11 hijacker. A Brooklyn apartment lease bears
Ziad Jarrah's name. [Boston
Globe, 9/25/01] "Another man named Ihassan Jarrah lived with Ziad,
drove a livery cab and paid the eight-hundred-dollar monthly rent. The men were
quiet, well-mannered, said hello and good-bye. Ziad Jarrah carried a camera and
told his landlords that he was a photographer. He would disappear for a few
days on occasion, then reappear. Sometimes a woman who appeared to be a
prostitute arrived with one of the men. 'Me and my brother used to crack jokes
that they were terrorists,' said Jason Matos, a construction worker who lived
in a basement there, and whose mother owned the house." [Among the Heroes,
Jere Longman, 2002, p. 90] However, Ziad Jarrah is actually
still in his home country of Lebanon at this time. He is studying in a Catholic
school in Beirut, and is in frequent contact with the rest of his family. His
parents drive him home to be with the family nearly every weekend, and they are
in frequent contact by telephone as well. [Los
Angeles Times, 10/23/01] Not until April 1996 does Jarrah leave Lebanon for
the first time, to study in Germany. [Boston
Globe, 9/25/01] His family believes that the New York lease proves that
there were two Jarrahs. [CNN,
9/18/01] This is not the only example of their Jarrah being in two places
at the same time - see Late
November 2000-January 30, 2001. Could Jarrah have had a
doppelganger?
Spring 1995: In the wake of the uncovering of the Operation Bojinka plot, a
letter written by the terrorists who planned the failed 1993 WTC bombing (see February
26, 1993) is found on a computer disk in the Philippines. This
letter warns that future attacks would be more precise and they would continue
to target the WTC if their demands were not met. This letter was never sent,
but its contents are revealed in 1998 congressional testimony. [Congressional
Hearings, 2/24/98] The Manila, Philippines police chief also reports
discovering a statement from bin Laden around this time that although they
failed to blow up the WTC in 1993, "on the second attempt they would be
successful." [AFP, 9/13/01]
Why wasn't security at the WTC noticeably improved after these revelations,
or later?
April 3, 1995: Time magazine's cover story reports on the potential for terrorists
to kill thousands in highly destructive acts. Senator Sam Nunn outlines a
scenario in which terrorists destroy the US Capitol Building by crashing a
radio controlled airplane into it. "Its not far-fetched," he says.
His idea was taken from Tom Clancy's book Debt of Honour published in
August 1994. [Time, 4/3/95]
High-ranking al-Qaeda leaders later claim that Flight 93's target was the
Capitol Building. [Guardian,
9/9/02]
October
21, 1995: The oil company Unocal signs a
contract with Turkmenistan to export $8 billion worth of natural gas through a
$3 billion pipeline which would go from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan.
Political considerations and pressures allow Unocal to edge out a more
experienced Argentinean company for the contract. Henry Kissinger, a Unocal
consultant, calls it "the triumph of hope over experience." [Washington
Post, 10/5/98]
November 13, 1995: Two
truck bombs kill five Americans and two Indians in a US-operated Saudi National
Guard training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda is blamed for the
attacks. [AP,
8/19/02] The attack changes US investigators' views of bin Laden from
terrorist financier to terrorist leader. [The Cell, John Miller, Michael
Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, p. 150]
Late
1995: King Fahd of Saudi Arabia suffers a severe stroke.
Afterwards, he is able to sit in a chair and open his eyes, but little more.
The resulting lack of leadership begins a behind-the-scenes struggle for power
and leads to increased corruption. The situation continues to this day. Crown
Prince Abdullah has been urging his fellow princes to address the problem of
corruption in the kingdom - so far unsuccessfully. A former White House adviser
says: "The only reason Fahd's being kept alive is so Abdullah can't become
king." [New Yorker,
10/16/01]
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1996: Al-Muqatila,
a Libyan group that is actually the cover name of an al-Qaeda terrorist cell,
tries to kill Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. Al-Qadhafi survives,
but several terrorists and innocent bystanders are killed. [Dawn, 10/30/02] According to David Shayler, a member of the British intelligence
agency MI5, and Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, authors of the
controversial book The Forbidden Truth, the related British intelligence
agency MI6 pays al-Qaeda the equivalent of $160,000 to help fund this
assassination attempt. Shayler later goes to prison for revealing this
information and the British press is banned from discussing the case. [New York Times,
8/5/98, Observer,
11/10/02] Well after the failed attempt, the British continue to support
al-Muqatila - for instance, the group publishes a newsletter from a London
office. [The Forbidden Truth, by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume
Dasquié, 5/02 edition, pp. 97-98] Anas al-Liby, a member of the Libyan al-Qaeda
cell, is given political asylum in Britain and lives there until May 2000. He
is now on the US's most wanted list, with a $25 million reward for his capture.
[Observer,
11/10/02] The Forbidden Truth claims that even in 1998 Britain and
the US aren't very interested in capturing bin Laden because of his assistance
in plots like these (see April 15, 1998). The British
government later attempts to censor their role in this assassination attempt
(see November 5, 2002).
1996
(C): The Saudi Arabian government starts paying huge amounts
of money to al-Qaeda, becoming its largest financial backer. It also gives
money to other extremist groups throughout Asia. This money vastly increases
the capability of al-Qaeda. [New
Yorker, 10/16/01] Saudis agree to continue sponsoring bin Laden's network
(see also May 1996 and July 1998). Says one US official,
"'96 is the key year... Bin Laden hooked up to all the bad guys - it's
like the Grand Alliance - and had a capability for conducting large-scale
operations." The Saudi regime, he says, had "gone to the dark side."
Electronic intercepts by the NSA "depict a regime increasingly corrupt,
alienated from the country's religious rank and file, and so weakened and
frightened that it has brokered its future by channeling hundreds of millions
of dollars in what amounts to protection money to fundamentalist groups that
wish to overthrow it." US officials later privately complain
"that the Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration, is
refusing to confront this reality, even in the aftermath of the September 11th
terrorist attacks." [New
Yorker, 10/16/01]
1996
(D): Having found a business card of a US flight school in the
possession of Bojinka plotter Abdul Hakim Murad (see January 6, 1995), the FBI
investigates the US flight schools Murad attended. [Washington
Post, 9/23/01] He had trained at about 6 flight schools off and on,
starting in 1990. Apparently they stop their investigation when they
fail to find any other potential suspects (see May 18, 1998). [Insight,
5/27/02]
1996-December 2000: Thirteen
of the hijackers disappeared for significant periods of time before the end of
2000:
1) Nawaf Alhazmi: The CIA says he was in the Bosnia conflict in the mid-1990s [CIA Director
Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02] He fought in Chechnya in 1996 [Observer,
9/23/01] and/or 1998. [Arab News, 9/20/01, ABC News,
1/9/02] He also visited Afghanistan before 1998 and swore loyalty to bin
Laden. [CIA
Director Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02]
2) Khalid Almihdhar: The CIA says he was in the Bosnia conflict in the
mid-1990s [CIA
Director Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02] His family claims he left to fight in
Chechnya in 1997. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02]
3) Salem Alhazmi: spent time in Chechnya with his brother Nawaf Alhazmi. [ABC News,
1/9/02]
4) Ahmed Alhaznawi: left for Chechnya in 1999 [ABC News,
1/9/02], lost family contact in late 2000. [Arab News, 9/22/01]
5) Hamza Alghamdi: left for Chechnya in early 2000. [Independent, 9/27/01,
[Washington
Post, 9/25/01] Another report says he went there around January 2001. He
called home several times until about June 2001, saying he was in Chechnya. [Arab
News, 9/18/01]
6) Mohand Alshehri: went to fight in Chechnya in early 2000. [Arab News, 9/22/01]
7) Ahmed Alnami: left home in June 2000, called home once in June 2001 from an
unnamed location. [Arab
News, 9/19/01, Washington
Post, 9/25/01]
8) Fayez Ahmed Banihammad: left home in July 2000 saying he wanted to
participate in a holy war or do relief work. [St.
Petersburg Times, 9/27/01, Washington
Post, 9/25/01] He called his parents one time since. [Arab
News, 9/18/01]
9) Ahmed Alghamdi: left his studies to fight in Chechnya in 2000, last seen by
his family in December 2000. He last called his parents in July 2001 but didn't
mention being in the US. [Arab
News, 9/18/01, Arab
News, 9/20/01]
10) Waleed Alshehri: disappeared with Wail Alshehri in December 2000, spoke of
fighting in Chechnya. [Washington
Post, 9/25/01, Arab
News, 9/18/01]
11) Wail Alshehri: had psychological problems, went with his brother to Mecca
to seek help and both disappeared, spoke of fighting in Chechnya. [Washington
Post, 9/25/01]
12) Majed Moqed: last seen by a friend in 2000 in Saudi Arabia, who said,
"he had a plan to visit the United States to learn English." [Arab News, 9/22/01]
Clearly there is a pattern: 11 appear likely to have fought in Chechnya, and
two others are known to have gone missing. It's possible that others have
similar histories, but it's hard to tell because "almost nothing [is]
known about some." [New
York Times, 9/21/01] Furthermore, a colleague claims hijackers Atta, Marwan
Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah and would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh wanted to fight
in Chechnya but were told in early 2000 that they were needed elsewhere. [Washington
Post, 10/23/02, Reuters,
10/29/02] Reuters has reported: "Western
diplomats play down any Chechen involvement by al-Qaeda." [Reuters,
10/24/02] The Chechnya connection to the 9/11 plot has been hardly
discussed; could this be because of political implications with Russia?
Many of the FBI hijackers photos appear to be incorrect (see September 16-23, 2001). Could
some hijackers have died fighting in Chechnya and had their identities used by
someone else? If so, it might not be the first time this technique was
used: former CIA director James Woolsey claims bin Laden agents murdered 12 men
during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, stole their paperwork, then used
their identities for later plots such as the WTC bombing in 1993. [MSNBC, 9/27/01]
January 1996: US intelligence gets information concerning a planned suicide
attack by individuals connected with Shaykh Omar Adb al-Rahman and a key
al-Qaeda operative. The plan is to fly from Afghanistan to the US and attack the
White House. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
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January-May 1996: In the
months after uncovering Operation Bojinka in the Philippines (see January
6, 1995), nearly all of its major planners, including Ramzi Yousef,
are found and arrested. The one exception is 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed. He flees to Qatar in the Persian Gulf, where he lives openly using
his real name, enjoying the patronage of Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Qatar's
Interior Minister and a member of the royal family. [ABC
News, 2/7/03] In January 1996, he is indicted in the US for his role in the
1993 WTC bombing, and in the same month the US determines his location in
Qatar. FBI Director Louis Freeh sends a letter to the Qatari government asking
for permission to send a team after him. [Los
Angeles Times, 12/22/02] One of Freeh's diplomatic notes
states that Mohammed was involved in a conspiracy to "bomb US
airliners" and is believed to be "in the process of manufacturing an
explosive device." [New Yorker, 5/27/02]
Qatar confirms that Mohammed is there and is making an explosive, but they
delay in handing him over. After waiting several months, a high level meeting
takes place in Washington to consider a commando raid to seize him. But the raid is deemed too risky, and another letter is sent to
the Qatari government instead. One person at the meeting later states, "If
we had gone in and nabbed this guy, or just cut his head off, the Qatari
government would not have complained a bit. Everyone around the table for their
own reasons refused to go after someone who fundamentally threatened American
interests...." [Los
Angeles Times, 12/22/02] Around May 1996, Mohammed's patron Abdallah bin
Khalid al-Thani makes sure that Mohammed and four
others are given blank passports and a chance to escape. Qatar's police chief
later says the other men include Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef,
al-Qaeda's number two and number three leaders respectively (see also Late
1998 (E)). [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02, ABC
News, 2/7/03] In late 1997 former CIA agent
Robert Baer learns how the Qataris helped Mohammed escape and passes the information
to the CIA, but they appear uninterested (see December
1997). Bin Laden twice visits al-Thani in Qatar. [New York Times,
6/8/02, ABC
News, 2/7/03] Does the US miss a chance to
catch bin Laden by not caring about al-Thani? After
leaving Qatar, Mohammed takes part in many terrorist acts (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001).
Early 1996: The
CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center creates a special unit to focus specifically on
bin Laden. About 10-15 individuals are assigned to the unit initially. This
grows to about 35-40 by 9/11. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] The unit is set up "largely because
of evidence linking him to the 1993 bombing of the WTC." [Washington
Post, 10/3/01 (C)]
Early
1996-October 1998: In early 1996, a friend gives bin Laden a
satellite phone. The phone is used by both bin Laden and his military commander
Muhammad Atef to direct al-Qaeda's operations. But its use is
discontinued two months after a US missile strike against his camps (see August 20, 1998), when an unnamed
senior official boasts that the US can track his movements through the use of
the phone. [Sunday
Times, 3/24/02, Senator
Shelby Congressional Inquiry Report, 12/11/02] Records
show "Britain was at the heart of the terrorist's planning for his
worldwide campaign of murder and destruction," since 260 calls were made
to 27 phone numbers in Britain. The other countries called were Yemen (over 200
calls), Sudan (131), Iran (106), Azerbaijan (67), Pakistan (59), Saudi Arabia
(57), a ship in the Indian Ocean (13), US (6), Italy (6), Malaysia (4) and
Senegal (2). "The most surprising omission is Iraq, with not a single call
recorded." [Sunday
Times, 3/24/02] Why weren't these calls used more
aggressively to target bin Laden and the people he called?
March 1996: The
US pressures Sudan to do something about bin Laden, who is based in that
country. Sudan readily agrees, not wanting to be labeled a terrorist
nation. Sudan's Minister of Defense engages in secret negotiations with
the CIA in Washington. Sudan offers to extradite bin Laden to anywhere he might
stand trial. The US decides not to take him
because they apparently don't have enough evidence at the time to charge him
with a crime. Saudi Arabia is discussed as a
possibility, but the Saudi Arabian government doesn't want him, even though bin
Laden has pledged to bring down the Saudi Arabian government. US officials turn down the offer, but insist that bin
Laden leave the country for anywhere but Somalia. One US intelligence
source in the region later states: "We kidnap minor drug czars and bring
them back in burlap bags. Somebody didn't want this to happen." [Village Voice, 10/31/01,
Washington
Post, 10/3/01] Bin Laden leaves under pressure two months later (see May 18, 1996). CIA Director Tenet later denies Sudan made any offers to hand
over bin Laden. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
April
1996: In continuing negotiations between the US and
Sudan, the US again rejects Sudan's offer to turn over voluminous files about
bin Laden and al-Qaeda (see 1995). Another American
involved in the secret negotiations later says that the US could have used
Sudan's offer to keep an eye on bin Laden, but that the efforts were blocked by
another arm of the federal government. "I've never seen a brick wall like
that before. Somebody let this slip up," he says. "We could
have dismantled his operations and put a cage on top. It was not a matter
of arresting bin Laden but of access to information. That's the story, and
that's what could have prevented September 11. I knew it would come back to
haunt us." [Village
Voice, 10/31/01, Washington
Post, 10/3/01] Around this time Sudan also offers their al-Qaeda
intelligence to MI6, the British intelligence agency, and are also rebuffed. Sudan
makes a standing offer: "If someone from MI6 comes to us and declares
himself, the next day he can be in [the capital city] Khartoum." A
Sudanese government source later adds, "We have been saying this for
years." The offer is not taken up until after 9/11. [Guardian,
9/30/01]
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May
1996: Reporter Greg Palast later claims that there is a
meeting of Saudi billionaires at the Hotel Royale Monceau in Paris this month
with the financial representative of al-Qaeda. "The Saudis, including a
key Saudi prince joined by Muslim and non-Muslim gun traffickers, [meet] to
determine who would pay how much to Osama. This [is] not so much an act of
support but of protection -- a payoff to keep the mad bomber away from Saudi
Arabia" (see also 1996
(C)). [Best
Democracy Money Can Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03] The 9/11 victims'
relatives also site a "nonpublished French intelligence report" of
this meeting in their lawsuit against important Saudis. [Minneapolis
Star-Tribune, 8/16/02] Palast claims that the Saudi Sheikh Abdullah Bakhsh
attends the meeting. Bakhsh also saved Bush Jr.'s Harken Oil from bankruptcy
around 1990. The notorious Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi also attends the
meeting. [Santa
Fe New Mexican, 3/20/03, Democracy Now,
3/4/03] In a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner, Slate has claimed that
Khashoggi is a "shadowy international arms merchant" who is
"connected to every scandal of the past 40 years." Amongst other
things, he was a major investor in BCCI and a key player in the Iran-Contra
affair. [Slate, 12/4/00, Slate, 11/14/01, Slate, 3/12/03] Saudi billionaire
Khalid bin Mahfouz also apparently attends the meeting (though it could be a
later meeting with Khashoggi in 1998). [Business
Post, 10/7/01] Palast, noting that the French
monitored the meeting, asks, "Since US intelligence was thus likely
informed, the question becomes why didn't the government immediately move
against the Saudis?" [Best
Democracy Money Can Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03] An apparent follow-up
meeting occurs in 1998 (see July 1998).
May
18, 1996: Sudan expels bin Laden at the
request of the US and Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda then move to
Afghanistan, taking all of their money, resources and personnel. Bin Laden
flies there in a C-130 transport plane with an entourage of about 150 men,
women and children. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] The US knows in advance that bin
Laden is going to Afghanistan, but does nothing to stop him. Elfatih Erwa, who,
Sudan's minister of state for defense at the time, later says in an interview:
"We warned [the US]. In Sudan, bin Laden and his money were under our
control. But we knew that if he went to Afghanistan no one could control
him. The US didn't care; they just didn't want him in Somalia. It's
crazy." [Village
Voice, 10/31/01, Washington
Post, 10/3/01]
June 1996: Jamal
al-Fadl, an al-Qaeda operative from al-Qaeda's first meeting in the late 1980s
until 1995, tells the US everything he knows about al-Qaeda. "Before
al-Fadl's debriefings, US intelligence had amassed thick files on bin Laden and
his associates and contacts. But they'd had no idea how the many pieces fit
together. 'Al-Fadl was the Rosetta Stone,' an official says. 'After al-Fadl,
everything fell into place.'" [The Cell, John Miller, Michael Stone
and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, pp. 154-165] Yet the US will not
take "bin Laden or al-Qaeda all that seriously" until after the
bombing of US embassies in Africa in 1998. [The Cell, John Miller,
Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, pp. 213]
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June
24, 1996: Uzbekistan signs a deal with Enron
"that could lead to joint development of the Central Asian nation's
potentially rich natural gas fields." [Houston
Chronicle, 6/25/96] The $1.3 billion venture teams Enron with the state
companies of Russian and Uzbekistan. [Houston
Chronicle, 6/30/96] On July 8, 1996, the US government agrees to give $400
million to help Enron and an Uzbeki state company develop these natural gas
fields. [Oil
and Gas Journal, 7/8/96] However, the deal is later canceled when it
becomes apparent a gas pipeline will not be built across Afghanistan, and there
is no easy way to get the gas out of the region (see November 1993 and June 1998 (B)).
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June 25, 1996:
Explosions destroy the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19
American soldiers and wounding 500. [CNN, 6/26/96] Saudi officials later interrogate the suspects, declare them
guilty, and execute them - without letting the FBI talk to them. [PBS
Frontline, 2001, Irish
Times, 11/19/01] Saudis blame the Hezbollah, the Iranian-influenced group,
but US investigators still believe bin Laden was somehow involved (in June 2001
a US grand jury indicted 13 Saudis for the bombing). [Seattle
Times, 10/29/01] Bin Laden admitted instigating the attacks in a 1998
interview. [Miami
Herald, 9/24/01] Ironically, the bin Laden family is later awarded the
contract to rebuild the installation. [New Yorker,
11/5/01] In 1997, Canada catches one of the
Khobar Tower attackers and extradites him to the US. But in 1999, he is shipped
back to Saudi Arabia before he can reveal what he knows about al-Qaeda and the
Saudis. One anonymous insider calls it, "Clinton's parting kiss to the
Saudis." [Best
Democracy Money Can Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03]
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Mid-1996-September
11, 2001: After fleeing Qatar (see January-May
1996), 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed travels the world and
plans many terror acts. He is apparently involved in the 1998 US embassy
bombings (see August 7, 1998), the 2000 USS Cole
bombing (see October 12, 2000) and other
attacks. He previously was involved in the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993) and the Bojinka
plot (see January 6, 1995). [Time, 1/20/03]
One US official says, "There is a clear operational link between him and
the execution of most, if not all, of the al-Qaeda plots over the past five
years." [Los
Angeles Times, 12/22/02] He lives in Prague, Czech Republic, through much
of 1997. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] By 1999 he is living in Germany and visiting with
the hijackers there (see 1999
(K)). [New York Times,
9/22/02] Using 60 aliases and as many passports, he travels through Europe,
Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and South America, personally setting
up al-Qaeda cells. [Los
Angeles Times, 12/22/02, Time, 1/20/03]
The US announces a $2 million reward for his capture in 1998. [New York Times,
6/5/02] But supposedly, US investigators only learn of Mohammed's large
role in al-Qaeda after 9/11. [Committee Findings,
12/11/02, Los
Angeles Times, 12/22/02] However, one official says, "We have been
after him for years, and to say that we weren't is just wrong. We had
identified him as a major al-Qaeda operative before Sept. 11." [New York Times,
9/22/02] If reports are true that Mohammed
is given protection by Pakistan (Early
1994-January 1995), and is possibly even an ISI agent (see June
4, 2002), doesn't that make Pakistan responsible for all of these
terrorist acts?
Mid-1996-October
2001: In 1996, Ariana Airlines, the national airline of Afghanistan, is essentially
taken over by al-Qaeda and becomes the transportation for an illegal trade
network. Passenger flights become few and erratic; instead the airline begins
flying drugs, weapons, gold and personnel mostly between Afghanistan, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Pakistan. The Emirate of Sharjah,
in the UAE, becomes a hub for al-Qaeda drug and arms smuggling. Typically
"large quantities of drugs" would be flown from Kandahar,
Afghanistan, to Sharjah, and large quantities of weapons would be flown
back to Afghanistan. [Los
Angeles Times, 11/18/01] About three to four flights a day would run the
route. Many weapons come from Victor Bout, a notorious Russian arms dealer
based in Sharjah (see October 1996). [Los
Angeles Times, 1/20/02] Afghan taxes on opium production would be paid in
gold, and then the gold bullion would be flown to Dubai, UAE, and laundered
into cash. [Washington
Post, 2/17/02] Taliban officials regularly provide terrorists with false
papers identifying them as Ariana employees so they can move freely around the
world. A former National Security Council
official later claims the US is well aware at the time that al-Qaeda agents
regularly fly on Ariana, but the US fails to act for several years. The US does
press the UAE for tighter banking controls, but moves "delicately, not
wanting to offend an ally in an already complicated relationship," and
little changes by 9/11. [Los
Angeles Times, 11/18/01] Much of the money for the 9/11
hijackers flows though these Sharjah channels (see June
29, 2000-September 18, 2000 and September
8-11, 2001 (C)). Could the 9/11 attacks have been
stopped if the US pressed harder to shut down the Sharjah al-Qaeda money
channels? There also are reports suggesting
that Ariana Airlines might have been used to train Islamic militants as pilots
(see October 1, 2001 (C)). The illegal
behavior of Ariana helps cause the United Nations to impose sanctions against
Afghanistan in 1999 (see November 14, 1999), but the
sanctions lack teeth and don't stop the airline. A second round of sanctions
finally stops foreign Ariana flights. But Ariana charter flights and other
charter services keep the illegal network running (see January 19, 2001). Ariana and the
network is finally largely destroyed in the October 2001 US bombing of
Afghanistan. [Los
Angeles Times, 11/18/01]
July 6-August 11, 1996: US officials identify crop-dusters and suicide flights as
potential terrorist weapons that could threaten the Olympic Games in Atlanta,
Georgia. They take steps to prevent any air attacks. Planes are banned from
getting too close to Olympic events. During the games, Black Hawk
helicopters and US Customs Service jets are deployed to intercept suspicious
aircraft over the Olympic venues. Agents monitor crop-duster flights
within hundreds of miles of downtown Atlanta. Law enforcement agents also fan
out to regional airports throughout northern Georgia "to make sure nobody
hijacked a small aircraft and tried to attack one of the venues," says
Woody Johnson, the FBI agent in charge. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/18/01]
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July
7, 1996: The Institute for Advanced Strategic
and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, publishes a paper entitled
"A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." [Chicago
Sun-Times, 3/6/03] The paper isn't much different from other Israeli
right-wing papers at the time, except the authors: the lead writer is Richard
Perle, now chairman of the Defense Policy Board in the US, and very influential
with President Bush. Several of the other authors now hold key positions in
Washington. The paper advises the new, right-wing Israeli leader Binyamin
Netanyahu to make a complete break with the past by adopting a strategy
"based on an entirely new intellectual foundation, one that restores
strategic initiative and provides the nation the room to engage every possible
energy on rebuilding Zionism ..." The first step would be the removal of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. A war with Iraq would destabilize the entire Middle
East, allowing governments in Syria, Iran, Lebanon and other countries to be
replaced. "Israel will not only contain its foes; it will transcend
them," the paper concludes. [Guardian,
9/3/02, see the original paper here]
Perle will be instrumental is moving Bush's US policy towards war with Iraq
(see September 17, 2001 (B)).
August 1996: Bin
Laden issues a public fatwa, or religious decree, authorizing attacks on
Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula. In previous years bin Laden
was thought by some to be more of a financier of terrorist attacks than a
terrorist himself, but this erases all doubts. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
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August
13, 1996: Unocal and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia
come to agreement with state companies in Turkmenistan and Russia to to build a
natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, the
agreement is finalized the next year (see October 27, 1997). [Unocal website, 8/13/96]
The Boston Herald later reports that, "The prime
force behind Delta Oil appears to be Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi" (see November 22, 2002 (B)) and that
his business interests are "enmeshed" with those of Khalid bin
Mahfouz (see for instance 1988
and April
1999). Together and separately, al-Amoudi and bin Mahfouz have
become "partners with US firms in a series of ambitious oil development
and pipeline projects in central and south Asia." [Boston
Herald, 12/10/01] The two are later included in a secret United Nations
list of financiers funding al-Qaeda (see November 26, 2002).
September 5, 1996: Terrorist
Ramzi Yousef and two other defendants, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin
Shah, are convicted of crimes relating to Project Bojinka, a failed al-Qaeda
plan Yousef devised that would have crashed 11 or 12 planes into buildings
simultaneously (see January 1995). [CNN, 9/5/96] Many people,
including some experts, have said that Yousef was convicted on September 11,
1996 (for instance, see [A Stunning
Intelligence Failure, Paul Monk,
2002]), and this would explain why that date would be
chosen in 2001, but that appears to be incorrect.
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September
11, 1996: An FBI investigation into two
relatives of bin Laden, begun in February 1996, is closed. The FBI wanted
to learn more about Abdullah bin Laden, "because of his relationship with
the World Assembly of Muslim Youth [WAMY] - a suspected terrorist
organization." [Guardian,
11/7/01] Abdullah was the US director of WAMY and lived with his brother
Omar in Falls Church, Virginia, a town just outside Washington. The coding
on the document, marked secret, indicates the case involved espionage, murder,
and national security. WAMY has its offices at 5613 Leesburg
Pike. Remarkably, it is later determined that four of the 9/11 hijackers lived at 5913 Leesburg Pike at the same time the two bin Laden
brothers were there. WAMY has not been put on a list of terrorist
organizations in the US, but it has been banned in Pakistan. A high-placed intelligence official tells the Guardian:
"There were always constraints on investigating the Saudis. There
were particular investigations that were effectively killed." An
unnamed US source says to the BBC, "There is a hidden agenda at the very
highest levels of our government." [BBC Newsnight,
11/6/01, Guardian,
11/7/01, see related leaked documents here] The
Bosnian government later says a charity with Abdullah bin Laden on its board
had channeled money to Chechen guerrillas (see also September
20, 2002 (C)), something that "is only possible because the
Clinton CIA gave the wink and nod to WAMY and other groups who were aiding
Bosnian guerrillas when they were fighting Serbia, a US-approved enemy."
The investigation into WAMY is only restarted two days after 9/11, and after
the bin Laden brothers have left the US. [Best Democracy Money Can
Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03] (Note that this Abdullah bin Laden is
possibly bin Laden's cousin, not brother, and is apparently not the same as the
Abdullah bin Laden who serves as the bin Laden family spokesman. [Best Democracy Money Can
Buy, by Greg Palast, 2/03])
September 27,
1996: The Taliban conquer Kabul [AP,
8/19/02], establishing control over much of Afghanistan. A surge in the Taliban's military successes at this time is
later attributed to an increase in direct military assistance from Pakistan's
ISI. [New
York Times, 12/8/01] The oil company Unocal is hopeful
that the Taliban will stabilize Afghanistan, and allow its pipeline plans to go
forward. In fact, "preliminary agreement [on the pipeline] was
reached between the [Taliban and Unocal] long before the fall of Kabul. ... Oil
industry insiders say the dream of securing a pipeline across Afghanistan is
the main reason why Pakistan, a close political ally of America's, has been so
supportive of the Taliban, and why America has quietly acquiesced in its
conquest of Afghanistan." [Telegraph,
10/11/96]
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October 1996: Since
1992, Russian arms merchant Victor Bout has been selling weapons to
Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, but this month he switches sides and begins
selling weapons to the Taliban and al-Qaeda instead (see also Mid-1996-October
2001). [Guardian,
4/17/02, Los
Angeles Times, 1/20/02, Los
Angeles Times, 5/17/02] The deal comes immediately after the Taliban
captures Kabul and gains the upper hand in Afghanistan's civil war (see September 27, 1996). Bout formerly
worked for the Russian KGB, and operates the world's largest private weapons
transport network. Based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bout operates
freely there until well after 9/11. The US becomes aware of
Bout's widespread illegal weapons trading in Africa in 1995, and of his ties to
the Taliban in 1996, but they fail to take effective action against him for
years. [Los
Angeles Times, 5/17/02] US pressure on the UAE in November 2000 to close
down Bout's operations there is ignored. Press reports calling him "the
merchant of death" also fail to pressure the UAE (for instance, [Financial
Times, 6/10/00, Guardian,
12/23/00]). After President Bush is elected, it appears the US gives up
trying to get Bout, until after 9/11. [Washington
Post, 2/26/02, Guardian,
4/17/02] In one trade in 1996, Bout's company delivers at
least 40 tons of Russian weapons to the Taliban, earning about $50 million. [Guardian,
2/16/02] Two intelligence agencies later
confirm that Bout trades with the Taliban "on behalf of the Pakistan
government." In late 2000, several Ukrainians sell 150 to 200 T-55 and
T-62 tanks to the Taliban in a deal conducted by the ISI, and Bout helps fly
the tanks to Afghanistan. [Montreal
Gazette, 2/5/02] Bout moves to Russia in 2002. He is seemingly
protected from prosecution by the Russian government, which in early 2002
claimed, "There are no grounds for believing that this Russian citizen has
committed illegal acts." [Guardian,
4/17/02] The Guardian suggests that Bout may
have worked with the CIA when he traded with the Northern Alliance, and this
fact may be hampering current international efforts to catch him. [Guardian,
4/17/02]
October 1996 (B): US intelligence learn of an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese
plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. While the plot was never carried
out, it is one more example of intelligence agencies being aware that planes
could be used as suicide weapons. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
October 11, 1996: The Telegraph publishes an
interesting article about pipeline politics in Afghanistan. Some quotes:
"Behind the tribal clashes that have scarred Afghanistan lies one of the
great prizes of the 21st century, the fabulous energy reserves of Central
Asia." "'The deposits are huge,' said a diplomat from the region.
‘Kazakhstan alone may have more oil than Saudi Arabia. Turkmenistan
is already known to have the fifth largest gas reserves in the world.'" [Telegraph,
10/11/96]
Late 1996: After moving the base of his operations to Afghanistan, bin
Laden quickly establishes and maintains a major role in the opium drug trade.
The money from opium is vital to keep the Taliban in power and fund bin Laden's
terrorist network. Yoseff Bodansky, director of the
congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare and author of
a 1999 biography on bin Laden, says bin Laden takes a 15 percent cut of the
drug trade money in exchange for protecting smugglers and laundering their
profits. [Star
Tribune, 9/30/01] A different estimate has bin Laden taking a cut of up to
10 percent of Afghanistan's drug trade by early 1999. This would give him a
yearly income of up to $1 billion out of $6.5 to $10 billion in drug profits
seen within Afghanistan each year. [Financial
Times, 11/28/01]
1997: While the State Department listed bin Laden as a financier of
terror in its 1996 survey of terrorism, al-Qaeda is not included on the 1997
official US list of terrorist organizations subject to various sanctions. They
are finally listed in 1998. [New
York Times, 12/30/01]
1997 (B): It is later claimed that the special CIA paramilitary
teams start entering Afghanistan in this year. [Washington
Post, 11/18/01]
1997 (C): FBI headquarters is concerned that an unnamed terrorist group
would possibly use an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for terrorist attacks. The
FBI and CIA become aware that this group had purchased a UAV. At the time, the
agencies believed that the only reason to use this UAV would be for either
reconnaissance or attack. There was more concern about the possibility of an
attack outside the United States, for example, by flying a UAV into a US
Embassy or a visiting US delegation. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
1997 or 1998: The
Spanish newspaper El Mundo later reports, "According to several professors
at the Valencia School of Medicine, some of whom are forensic experts, [Atta]
was a student there in 1997 or 1998. Although he used another name then, they
remember his face among the students that attended anatomy classes." It is
also suggested that "years before, as a student he went to Tarragona. That
would explain his last visit to Salou [(see July 8-19, 2001)], where he could
have made contact with dormant cells..." [El Mundo,
9/30/01] If this is true, it would contradict
Atta's presence as a student in Hamburg, Germany during this entire period. But
there are other accounts of Atta seemingly being in two places at once (see 1998-2000, September 1999, Late April-Mid-May 2000, and Spring 2000).
February 12, 1997: The
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, led by Vice President
Gore, issues its final report. [Gore
Commission, 2/12/97] But the report has little
practical effect: "Federal bureaucracy and airline lobbying slowed and
weakened a set of safety improvements recommended by a presidential commission
- including one that a top airline industry official now says might have
prevented the Sept. 11 terror attacks." [Los Angeles
Times, 10/6/01]
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March 1997: An
investigation of al-Qaeda contacts in Hamburg by the Constitutional Protection
Agency, Germany's domestic intelligence service, begins at least by this time (Germany won't give details). [New
York Times, 1/18/03] Telephone intercepts show that a
German investigation into Mohammed Haydar Zammar (see November 1, 1998-February 2001 and
October 27, 2001) is taking place
this month. It is later believed that Zammar, a German of Syrian origin, was a
part of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/14/03] He supposedly later claims he recruited Atta and
others into the cell. [Washington
Post, 6/19/02] Zammar had been identified a decade earlier by German
authorities as a militant. He also made a number of trips to and from
Afghanistan. [New
York Times, 1/18/03] German intelligence was aware that he
was personally invited to Afghanistan by bin Laden. [FAZ, 2/2/03]
Spanish investigators say Zammar was a longtime associate of
Barakat Yarkas, the alleged boss of Madrid, Spain's al-Qaeda cell (see August 27, 2001). Yarkas had
Zammar's phone number in his address book and Zammar visited Yarkas in Madrid.
[Los
Angeles Times, 1/14/03] The investigation into Zammar is perhaps later dropped for lack of evidence, though it continues
at least until September 1999 (see February 17, 1999). [AP, 6/22/02]
April
24, 1997: A package containing a petri dish
mislabeled "anthracks" is received at the B'nai B'rith headquarters
in Washington, DC. "The choice of B'nai B'rith probably was meant to
suggest Arab terrorists, because the building had once been the target of an
assault by Muslim gunmen." The dish did not contain anthrax but did
contain bacillus cereus, a very close, non-toxic cousin of anthrax used by the
US Defense Department. There are similarities to the later real anthrax attacks
(see October 4, 2001), such as the
misspelling "penacilin." In July 2002, B'nai B'rith claims the FBI still hasn't asked
them about this hoax anthrax attack. [New
York Times, 7/12/02]
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June
3, 1997: The Project for the New American
Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank formed in the spring of 1997,
issues its statement of principles. PNAC's stated aims: "to shape a new
century favorable to American principles and interests," to achieve
"a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American
principles abroad," "to increase defense spending
significantly," to challenge "regimes hostile to US interests and
values," and to "accept America's unique role in preserving and
extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and
our principles." [PNAC
Principles, 6/3/97] These principles matter because they are signed by a
group who will become "a rollcall of today's Bush inner circle." [Guardian,
2/26/03] ABC's Ted Koppel will later say PNAC's ideas have "been called
a secret blueprint for US global domination" (see also January 26, 1998, September 2000, August 21, 2001 (B)). [ABC News,
3/5/03 (B)]
August 1997: The CIA creates a secret task force to monitor Central Asia's
politics and gauge its wealth. Covert CIA officers, some well-trained petroleum
engineers, travel through southern Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan to sniff out potential oil reserves. [Time, 5/4/98]
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October
1997: Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski (see December
26, 1979) publishes a book in which he portrays the Eurasian
landmass as the key to world power, and Central Asia with its vast oil reserves
as the key to domination of Eurasia. He states that
for the US to maintain its global primacy, it must prevent any possible
adversary from controlling that region. He notes that, "The attitude
of the American public toward the external projection of American power has
been much more ambivalent. The public supported America’s engagement in
World War II largely because of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor." Furthermore, because of popular resistance to US military
expansionism, his ambitious Central Asian strategy could not be implemented
"except in the circumstance of a truly massive and widely perceived direct
external threat." [The Grand
Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, by
Zbigniew Brzezinski, 10/97 (the link is to excerpts of the book from a From the
Wilderness article)]
October
27, 1997: Halliburton, a company with future Vice
President Cheney as CEO, announces a new agreement to provide technical
services and drilling for Turkmenistan, a country in Central Asia. The
press release also mentions that "Halliburton has been providing a variety
of services in Turkmenistan for the past five years." On the same day, a
consortium to build a pipeline through Afghanistan is formed. It's called
CentGas, and the two main partners are Unocal and Delta Oil of Saudi
Arabia. [Halliburton
press release, 10/27/97, CentGas press release,
10/27/97]
November 26, 1997: An industry newsletter reports that Saudi Arabia has abandoned
plans to have open bids on a $2 billion power plant near Mecca, deciding that
the government will build it instead. What's interesting is that one of the
bids was made by a consortium of Enron, the Saudi Binladen
Group (run by Osama's family), and Italy's Ansaldo Energia. [Alexander's Gas and Oil
Connections, 1/22/98]
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December 1997: CIA
agent Robert Baer (see also August 2001 (G) and January 23, 2002), newly retired
from the CIA and working as a terrorism consultant, meets a former police chief
from the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. He learns how 9/11 mastermind Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed was sheltered from the FBI by the Qatari Interior Minister
Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani (see January-May
1996). He passes this information to the
CIA in early 1998, but the CIA takes no action against Qatar's al-Qaeda
patrons. The ex-police chief also tells him that
Mohammed is a key aide to bin Laden, and that based on Qatari intelligence,
Mohammed "is going to hijack some planes." He passes this information to the CIA as well, but again the
CIA doesn't seem interested, even when he tries again after 9/11. [UPI, 9/30/02,
Vanity
Fair, 2/02, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's
War on Terrorism, Robert Baer, 2/02, pp. 270-271] Baer
also tries to interest reporter Daniel Pearl in a story about Mohammed before
9/11, but Pearl is still working on it when he gets kidnapped and murdered (see
December
24, 2001-January 23, 2002). [UPI, 9/30/02]
The ex-police chief later disappears, presumably
kidnapped by Qatar. It has been speculated that the CIA turned on the source to
protect its relationship with the Qatari government. [Breakdown: How
America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, Bill Gertz, pp. 55-58]
It appears bin Laden visits Abdallah al-Thani in Qatar between the years 1996
and 2000. [ABC
News, 2/7/03] Al-Thani continues to support al-Qaeda, providing Qatari
passports and more than $1 million in funds. Even after 9/11, Mohammed is
provided shelter in Qatar for two weeks in late 2001. [New
York Times, 2/6/03] Yet the US still has not frozen al-Thani's assets or
taken other action. Could the US have captured bin Laden if they paid more
attention to Robert Baer's information?
December 4, 1997: Representatives of the Taliban are invited guests to the
Texas headquarters of Unocal to negotiate their support for the
pipeline. Future President Bush Jr. is Governor of Texas at the time. The
Taliban appear to agree to a $2 billion pipeline deal, but will do the deal
only if the US officially recognizes the
Taliban regime. The Taliban meet with US officials, and the Telegraph
reports that "the US government, which in the past has branded the
Taliban's policies against women and children 'despicable,' appears anxious to
please the fundamentalists to clinch the lucrative pipeline
contract." A BBC regional correspondent says "the proposal to
build a pipeline across Afghanistan is part of an international scramble to
profit from developing the rich energy resources of the Caspian Sea." [BBC, 12/4/97, Telegraph,
12/14/97] FTW
December 14, 1997: It is reported that Unocal has hired the University of
Nebraska to train 400 Afghani teachers, electricians, carpenters and
pipefitters in anticipation of using them for their pipeline in
Afghanistan. 150 students are already attending classes. [Telegraph,
12/14/97]
1998: According
to later closed session congressional testimony by the heads of the CIA, FBI
and NSA, al-Qaeda begins planning the 9/11 attacks in this year. [USA Today,
6/18/02] In a June 2002 interview, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
also says the planning for the attacks begin at this time. [AP, 9/8/02]
But it appears the targeting of the WTC and pilot training began even earlier.
An al-Qaeda operative in Spain will later be found with videos filmed in 1997
of major US structures (including "innumerable takes from all distances
and angles" of the WTC). There are numerous connections between Spain and
the 9/11 hijackers, including an important meeting there in July 2001 (see July 8-19, 2001). [AP, 7/17/02]
Hijacker Waleed Alshehri was living in Florida since 1995, started training for
his commercial pilot training degree in 1996, and got his license in 1997. [Sunday Herald, 9/16/01, Boston
Globe, 9/14/01] So the attack was probably planned
even earlier, but the earlier it was planned, the worse the US looks for not
catching it.
1998
(B): It is later revealed by Uzbekistan that Uzbekistan and
the US have been conducting joint covert operations against Afghanistan's
Taliban regime and bin Laden since at least before this year. [Times
of India, 10/14/01, Washington
Post, 10/14/01]
1998 (C): In
response to the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am 747 over Scotland, the FAA creates
"red teams" - small, secretive teams traveling to airports and
attempting to foil their security systems. "In 1998, the red team
completed extensive testing of screening checkpoints at a large number of
domestic airports... We were successful in getting major
weapons — guns and bombs — through screening checkpoints with
relative ease, at least 85 percent of the time in most cases. At one airport,
we had a 97 percent success rate in breaching the screening checkpoint."
"The individuals who occupied the highest seats of authority in FAA were
fully aware of this highly vulnerable state of aviation security and did
nothing." [New
York Times, 2/27/02] In 1999, the New York Port Authority and major
airlines at Boston's Logan Airport - used twice on 9/11 - "were fined a
total of $178,000 for at least 136 security violations over the previous two
years. In the majority of incidents, screeners hired by the airlines for
checkpoints in terminals routinely failed to detect test items, such as pipe
bombs and guns." [AP,
9/12/01] Did the terrorists know which airports were most vulnerable,
and take advantage of that knowledge?
1998 (D): A military report released this year describes a
program called "Joint Vision 2010", a series of "analyses,
wargames, studies, experiments, and exercises" which are
"investigating new operational concepts, doctrines, and organizational
approaches that will enable US forces to maintain full spectrum dominance of
the battlespace well into the 21st century." "The Air Force has begun
a series of wargames entitled Global Engagement at the Air War College, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama." The same article mentions that the military is
working on a "variety of new imaging and signals intelligence sensors,
currently in advanced stages of development, deployed aboard the Global Hawk,
DarkStar, and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)..." [Department of
Defense Annual Report, 1998] What is the relevance of this? It may be
complete coincidence, but "Air Force spokesman Col. Ken McClellan said a
man named Mohamed Atta -- which the FBI has identified as one of the five
hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 -- had once attended the International
Officer's School at Maxwell/Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala." [Gannett
News Service, 9/17/01] Global Hawk is a technology that enables pilotless
flight and has been functioning since at least early 1997. [Department of
Defense, 2/20/97] Some have claimed that Global Hawk technology was used
to manipulate events on 9/11. Could Atta have taken part in wargames involving
Global Hawk (see September 25, 2001)?
1998 (E): A son of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the al-Qaeda leader convicted in
1995 of conspiring to blow up tunnels and other New York City landmarks, is
heard to say that the best way to free his father from a US prison might be to
hijack an American plane and exchange the hostages. This is supposedly the most recent concrete hijacking report
Bush hears in his August 2001 briefing titled "Bin Laden Determined to
Strike in US" (see August 6, 2001). [Washington
Post, 5/17/02]
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1998 (F): An American Muslim named Aukai Collins later says he was
an FBI informant between 1996 and 1999, informing on the Muslim community in
Phoenix, Arizona. For six months in 1998, he is a casual acquaintance of
hijacker Hani Hanjour while Hanjour is taking flying lessons. [AP, 5/24/02]
Collins sees nothing suspicious about Hanjour as an individual, but he tells
the FBI about him because Hanjour appears to be part of a larger, organized
group of Arabs taking flying lessons. [Fox News,
5/24/02] He says the FBI "knew everything about the guy,"
including his exact address, phone number and even what car he drove. The FBI denies Collins told them anything about Hanjour, and
denies knowing about Hanjour before 9/11, though they acknowledge that they
paid Collins to monitor the Islamic and Arab communities in Phoenix. [ABC
News, 5/23/02] Collins later calls Hanjour a "hanky panky"
hijacker: "He wasn't even moderately religious, let alone fanatically
religious. And I knew for a fact that he wasn't part of al-Qaeda or any other
Islamic organization; he couldn't even spell jihad in Arabic." [My
Jihad: The True Story of an American Mujahid's Amazing Journey from Usama Bin
Laden's Training Camps to Counterterrorism with the FBI and CIA, Aukai
Collins, 6/02, p. 248]
1998 (G): Antoine
Sfeir, a French Arab specialist, later claims that bin Laden was a CIA asset in
the 1980s, and that the CIA maintains contact with bin Laden until this year.
He says, "Those contacts didn't end after bin Laden moved to
Afghanistan" (see May
18, 1996). He isn't surprised by reports of bin Laden meeting with
the CIA in July 2001 (see July
12, 2001) because, "Until the last minute, CIA agents hoped bin
Laden would return to US command, as was the case before 1998." [UPI, 11/1/01]
The CIA denies ever having any kind of relationship with bin Laden (see 1986).
1998-2000:
Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi live periodically in the town of Mabalacat,
Philippines. They stay in the Woodland Resort hotel and apparently learn to fly
planes at a nearby flight school. Philippine and US investigators have looked
into these visits but haven't confirmed the hijackers' presence there. Locals,
however, are certain they saw them frequently partying, drinking alcohol,
sleeping with local women, and consorting with many other, unknown Arabs (most
of whom disappear shortly before 9/11). For instance, according to a former
waitress at the hotel, Alshehhi throws a party in December 1999 with six or
seven Arab friends: "They rented the open area by the swimming pool for
1,000 pesos. They drank Johnnie Walker Black Label whiskey ... They came in big
vehicles, and they had a lot of money. They all had girlfriends." Several
employees recall Atta staying at the hotel during the summer of 1999, acting
unfriendly and cheap. One hotel employee claims that most of the guests were
Arab, and many took flying lessons at the nearby school. These witnesses claim
the two used aliases, but the other Arabs referred to Atta as
"Mohamed." [Manila
Times, 10/2/01, International
Herald Tribune, 10/5/01, AP, 9/28/01] Apparently, other hijackers and 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed visit the Philippines during this time (see Early 1994-January 1995 and 2000-September 10, 2001). However, according to the official version of events, Atta and
Alshehhi are in Hamburg, Germany during this time. Atta is still working on his
thesis, which he completes in late 1999. [Australian
Broadcasting Corp., 11/12/01]
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January
26, 1998: The Project for the New American
Century (PNAC), an influential neoconservative think tank, publishes a letter
to President Clinton, urging war against Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein
because he is a "hazard" to "a significant portion of the
world's supply of oil." In a foretaste of what eventually actually
happens, the letter calls for the US to go to war alone, attacks the United
Nations, and says the US should not be "crippled by a misguided insistence
on unanimity in the UN Security Council." The letter is signed by many who
will later lead the 2003 Iraq war. 10 of the 18 signatories later join the Bush
Administration, including (future) Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Armitage, Undersecretaries of State John Bolton and Paula Dobriansky,
presidential adviser for the Middle East Elliott Abrams, and Bush's special
Iraq envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (see also June 3, 1997, and September 2000). [Sunday Herald, 3/16/03, PNAC Letter,
1/26/98] Clinton does heavily bomb Iraq in late 1998, but the bombing
doesn't last long and its long-term effect is the break off of United Nations
weapons inspections. [New
York Times, 3/22/03]
February 12, 1998: Unocal Vice President John J. Maresca - later to become a
Special Ambassador to Afghanistan - testifies before the House of
Representatives that until a single, unified, friendly government is in place
in Afghanistan the trans-Afghani pipeline will not be built. He suggests
that with a pipeline through Afghanistan, the Caspian basin could produce 20
percent of all the non-OPEC oil in the world by 2010. [House
International Relations Committee testimony, 2/12/98] FTW
February
22, 1998: Bin Laden issues a fatwa,
declaring it the religious duty of all Muslims "to kill the Americans and
their allies - civilians and military ... in any country in which it is
possible." [PBS
Frontline, 2001, Sunday Herald,
9/16/01, complete text of the fatwa from al-Quds
al-Arabi, 2/23/98] This is an expansion of an earlier fatwa issued
in August 1996 (see August
1996).
Early 1998: Bill Richardson, the US Ambassador
to the UN, meets Taliban officials in Kabul (all such meetings are
technically illegal, because the US still officially recognizes the government
the Taliban ousted as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan). US officials
at the time call the oil and gas pipeline project a "fabulous
opportunity" and are especially motivated by the "prospect of
circumventing Iran, which offered another route for the pipeline." [Boston
Globe, 9/20/01]
Spring
1998: Sources who know bin Laden later claim that bin Laden's
mother has the first of two meetings with her son in Afghanistan. This trip was
arranged by Prince Turki al-Faisal, then the head of Saudi intelligence. Turki
was in charge of the "Afghanistan file" for Saudi Arabia, and had
long-standing ties to bin Laden and the Taliban (see Early 1980). [New Yorker,
11/5/01]
April
1998: Osama Basnan, a Saudi living in California, later
claims that he writes a letter at this time to Saudi Arabian Prince Bandar bin
Sultan and his wife, Princess Haifa bint Faisal, asking for financial help
because his wife, Majeda Dweikat, needs thyroid surgery. The Saudi embassy
sends Basnan $15,000 and pays the surgical bill. However, University of
California at San Diego hospital records say Basnan's wife wasn't treated until
April 2000. [Los Angeles
Times, 11/24/02] Basnan will later come under
investigation for possibly using some of this money to support two of the 9/11
hijackers who arrive in San Diego at the end of 1999 (see November
1999 (B), September
22, 2001, November
22, 2002).
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April 15, 1998: The
first Interpol (international police) arrest warrant for bin Laden is issued
by, of all countries, Libya. [Observer,
11/10/02] According to Jean-Charles Brisard and
Guillaume Dasquié, authors of the controversial book The Forbidden Truth,
British and US intelligence agencies play down the arrest warrant, and have the
public version of the warrant stripped of important information, such as the
summary of charges and the fact that Libya requested the warrant. At this
point, no Western country has yet issued a warrant for bin Laden, even though
he publicly called for attacks on Western targets beginning in 1996 (see 1996). The arrest warrant is
issued for the murder in 1994 of two German anti-terrorism agents. Supposedly,
Britain and the US aren't interested in catching bin Laden at this time due to
his involvement with Britain in attempts to assassinate Libyan leader Colonel
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi (see November 1996 and November 5, 2002). [The
Forbidden Truth, by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, 5/02
edition, pp. 97-98]
May 18,
1998: An Oklahoma newspaper later reports that the FBI office in
Oklahoma City sends a memo on this day warning that "large numbers of
Middle Eastern males" are getting flight training in Oklahoma and could be
planning terrorist attacks. [AP, 9/26/01,
CNN,
9/18/01] This remarkable story seems to have been reported only by one
Oklahoma daily. [NewsOK,
5/29/02, see the memo here] It appears this warning was not followed up. In 1999 it is
learned that an al-Qaeda agent had studied flight training at the Airman Flight
School in Norman, Oklahoma. Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi consider
studying at the same school in 2000; Zacarias Moussaoui does study at the
school in 2001 (see September
1999 (E)).
May 26, 1998: In a press conference from Afghanistan, bin Laden discusses
"bringing the war home to America." [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
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June
1998: Relations between Taliban head Mullah Omar and bin Laden grow tense, and Omar strikes a secret deal with the Saudis to expel bin
Laden. Head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal travels to Kandahar,
Afghanistan and brokers the deal, but before it can be
enacted, the US strikes Afghanistan in August, driving Omar and bin Laden back
together. Prince Turki states that "the
Taliban attitude changed 180 degrees," and that Omar was "absolutely
rude" to him when he visited again in September. [Guardian,
11/5/01, London
Times, 8/3/02] Note that reports of this meeting
seemingly contradict reports of a different secret meeting a month later (see July 1998). Was bin Laden charmed by luck, or might the embassy bombings
and/or the US missile attacks in response have been timed to help keep him in
Afghanistan?
June
1998 (B): Enron's agreement to develop
natural gas with the government of Uzbekistan is not renewed (see June 24, 1996). Enron closes
its office there. The reason for the "failure of Enron's flagship
project" is an inability to get the natural gas out of the
region. Uzbekistan's production is "well below capacity" and
only 10 percent of its production is being exported, all to other countries in
the region. The hope was to use a pipeline through Afghanistan, but
"Uzbekistan is extremely concerned at the growing strength of the Taliban
and its potential impact on stability in Uzbekistan, making any future
cooperation on a pipeline project which benefits the Taliban unlikely." A
$12 billion pipeline through China is being considered as one solution, but
that wouldn't be completed until the end of the next decade at the
earliest. [Alexander's
Gas and Oil Connections, 10/12/98]
June 1998 (C): US intelligence obtains information from several sources that bin
Laden is considering attacks in the US, including Washington and New York. This
information is given to senior US officials in July 1998. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
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June
1998 (D): An unknown Saudi benefactor pays a
Saudi named Saad Al-Habeeb to buy a building in San Diego, California for a new
Kurdish community mosque. However, the $545,000 needed will only be given on
the condition that a Saudi named Omar al-Bayoumi be installed as the building's
maintenance manager with a private office at the mosque. Al-Bayoumi is later
suspected of giving financial assistance to two of the 9/11 hijackers (see November
1999 (B) and November 22, 2002). After taking
the job, al-Bayoumi keeps an erratic schedule. The people in the mosque
eventually begin a move to replace al-Bayoumi, but he moves to Britain in May
or June 2001 before this can happen. [Newsweek, 11/24/02, Sunday
Mercury, 10/21/01] Al-Bayoumi who "often gave parties and videotaped
guests, was widely considered by Muslims [in San Diego] to be a Saudi
government agent" (see Mid-January 2000). [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/14/02] "He was always watching [young Saudi
college students], always checking up on them, literally following them around
and then apparently reporting their activities back to Saudi Arabia," says
Henry Bagadan, a Pakistani businessman who worships at the San Diego Islamic
Center. [Newsweek, 11/24/02]
An anonymous federal investigator states: "Al-Bayoumi came here, set
everything up financially, set up the San Diego [terrorist] cell and set up the
mosque." An international tax attorney notes that anyone handling business
for a mosque or a church could set it up as a tax-exempt charitable
organization "and it can easily be used for money laundering." [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 10/27/01, San
Diego Union-Tribune, 10/22/02] Until 1994, al-Bayoumi worked for the Saudi
Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of US
ambassador Prince Bandar. He told some people he received a monthly stipend
from his former employer, a Saudi aviation company called Dallah Avco that has
extensive ties to the same Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. He told
others that he was a student or a pilot and even claimed to be receiving monthly
payments from "family in India" (despite being Saudi), but the
explanations didn't seem credible. [Newsweek,
11/22/02, Newsweek,
11/24/02, Los Angeles
Times, 9/1/02, San
Diego Union-Tribune, 10/27/01, Sunday
Mercury, 10/21/01] The FBI is investigating possible ties between Dallah
Avco and al-Qaeda, [Newsweek,
10/29/02] and Saleh Abdullah Kamel, the billionaire owner of the company, is on a secret United
Nations list of terror financiers (see November 26, 2002).
June 8, 1998: A US
grand jury issues a sealed indictment charging bin Laden and other al-Qaeda
leaders with conspiracy to attack the US. The indictment is publicly released
on November 4, 1998. [PBS
Frontline 10/3/02]
June 23, 1998: Future Vice President Cheney, working for the Halliburton
energy company, states: "I can't think of a time when we've had a region
emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the
Caspian. It's almost as if the opportunities have arisen overnight."
The Caspian Sea is in Central Asia. [Cato Institute Library,
Chicago
Tribune, 8/10/00]
July 1998: According to documents exposed in a
later lawsuit, a meeting takes place in Kandahar, Afghanistan, that leads to a
secret deal between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban. Those present include Prince
Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi Arabian intelligence (see also Early
1980 and Spring 1998), Taliban leaders, senior officers from the ISI, and bin Laden. Saudi Arabia agrees to give the Taliban and Pakistan "several hundred
millions" of dollars, and in return bin Laden promises no attacks against
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis also agree to ensure that requests for the extradition
of al-Qaeda members will be blocked and promise to block demands by other
countries that bin Laden's Afghan training camps will be closed down. Saudi
Arabia had previously given money to the Taliban and bribe money to bin Laden
(see 1996 (C)), but this ups the ante.
[Sunday Times,
8/25/02] A few weeks after the meeting, Prince Turki sends 400 new pickup
trucks to Afghanistan. At least $200 million follow. [Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 9/23/01, New York
Post, 8/25/02] Note that reports of this meeting seemingly contradict
reports of a meeting the month before between Turki and the Taliban, in which
the Taliban agreed to get rid of bin Laden (see June 1998).
July 7, 1998: Thieves snatch a passport from a car driven by a US tourist in
Barcelona, Spain. The passport later finds its way into the hands of would-be
hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Bin al-Shibh allegedly uses the name on the
passport in the summer of 2001 as he wires money to pay flight school tuition
for Zacarias Moussaoui in Oklahoma. Investigators believe the movement of this
passport shows connections between the 9/11 plotters in Germany and a support
network in Spain, made up mostly by ethnic Syrians. "Investigators believe
that the Syrians served as deep-cover mentors, recruiters, financiers and
logistics providers for the hijackers - elite backup for an elite attack team"
(see also 1998). [Los
Angeles Times, 1/14/03] Atta twice travels to Spain,
perhaps to make contact with members of this Spanish support team (see January 4, 2001 (B) and July
8-19, 2001).
August
1998: A German inquiry into Mounir El Motassadeq,
an alleged member of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell with Atta, begins by this time. Though Germany won't reveal details,
documents show that by this month Motassadeq is under surveillance. "The
trail soon [leads] to most of the main [Hamburg] participants" in 9/11. On
August 29, 1998, surveillance records Motassadeq and Mohamed Haydar Zammar, who
had already been identified by police as a suspected extremist (see March 1997), meet at the Hamburg
home of Said Bahaji, who is also under surveillance that same year (Bahaji will
soon move into an apartment with Atta and other al-Qaeda members, see November 1, 1998-February 2001).
German police monitor several other meetings between the Motassadeq and Zammar
in the following months. [New
York Times, 1/18/03] Motassadeq is later put on trial in Germany for participation
in the 9/11 attacks (see August 29, 2002).
August 1998 (B): A CIA intelligence report asserts that Arab terrorists are
planning to fly a bomb-laden aircraft from a foreign country into the WTC. The
FBI and the FAA don't take the threat seriously because of the state of
aviation in that unnamed country. Later, other intelligence information
connects this group to al-Qaeda. [New York Times,
9/18/02, Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] An FBI spokesman says
the report "was not ignored, it was thoroughly investigated by numerous
agencies" and found to be unrelated to al-Qaeda. [Washington
Post, 9/19/02] The New York Times says the group is now believed to have
"had ties to al-Qaeda." [New York Times,
9/18/02]
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August 7, 1998: Terrorists
bomb the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The bomb in Nairobi, Kenya
kills 213 people, including 12 US nationals, and injures more than 4,500. The
bomb in Dar es Salaam kills 11 and injures 85. The attack is blamed on
al-Qaeda. [PBS
Frontline, 2001]
August
9, 1998: The Northern Alliance capital of Afghanistan,
Mazar-i-Sharif, is conquered by the Taliban. Military support of
Pakistan's ISI plays a large role; there is even an intercept of an ISI officer
stating, "My boys and I are riding into Mazar-i-Sharif." [New
York Times, 12/8/01] This victory gives the Taliban
control of 90% of Afghanistan, including the entire pipeline
route. CentGas, the consortium behind the gas pipeline that would run
through Afghanistan, is now "ready to proceed. Its main partners are the
American oil firm Unocal and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia, plus Hyundai of South
Korea, two Japanese companies, a Pakistani conglomerate and the Turkmen
government." However, the pipeline cannot be financed unless the
government is officially recognized. "Diplomatic sources said the
Taliban's offensive was well prepared and deliberately scheduled two months
ahead of the next UN meeting" to decide if the Taliban should be
recognized. [Telegraph,
8/13/98]
August
20, 1998: The US fires 66 missiles at six training
camps in Afghanistan and 13 missiles at a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum,
Sudan in retaliation for the US embassy bombings. [Washington
Post, 10/3/01 (C)] The US makes clear the attacks are
aimed at terrorists "not supported by any state'' despite obvious evidence
to the contrary in Afghanistan. About 30 people are killed in the attacks,
but no important al-Qaeda figures. [Observer,
8/23/98, New Yorker,
1/24/00] Suspected terrorist financiers Khalid
bin Mahfouz (see April
1999) and Mohammed Hussein al-Amoudi (see
November 22, 2002 (B)) appear to
have been the main investors in the Sudanese factory. However, "subsequent
lab tests and court actions leave little doubt the El Shifa plant was producing
only human and veterinary drugs." [Ottawa
Citizen, 9/29/01] The US later unfreezes the bank accounts of the nominal
factory owner and takes other actions indicating guilt, but admits no
wrongdoing. It is later learned that of the six camps targeted in Afghanistan,
only four were hit, and of those only one had connections to bin Laden. Two of the camps belong to the ISI, and five ISI officers and
some twenty trainees are killed. Clinton says on TV that the missiles
were aimed at a "gathering of key terrorist leaders", which turns out
to have taken place a month earlier, in Pakistan. [Observer,
8/23/98, New Yorker,
1/24/00] Was intelligence really that bad, or was Clinton set up by his
own intelligence agencies to fail, so he wouldn't try to attack bin Laden in
the future, and thus deprive them of a war on terrorism?
August 24, 1998: The New York Times reports that the training camps recently
attacked by the US (see August 20, 1998) were actually
built years before by the US and its allies. The US and Saudi Arabia gave the
Afghans between $6 billion and $40 billion to fight the Soviets in the 1980s
(see December 26, 1979). Many of the
people targeted by the Clinton missile attacks were actually trained and
equipped by the CIA years before. [New York Times,
8/24/98]
Late August 1998: A captured member of the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the US embassy
in Kenya tells an FBI agent about a conversation he had with his cell's leader.
The leader told him that al-Qaeda was planning an attack on the US, but
"Things are not ready yet. We don't have everything prepared." [USA
Today, 8/29/02]
September 1998: US intelligence gives a memorandum to senior officials detailing
al-Qaeda's infrastructure in the US. This includes the use of fronts for terrorist
activities. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
September 1998 (B): US intelligence finds information that bin Laden’s next
operation could possibly involve crashing an aircraft loaded with explosives
into a US airport. This information is provided to senior US officials. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Washington
Post, 9/19/02]
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September 20,
1998: Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an al-Qaeda terrorist from the United Arab
Emirates connected to the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998), is arrested near
Munich, Germany. [PBS
Newshour, 9/30/98] In retrospect, it appears he was making one of many
visits to the al-Qaeda cells in Germany. [The Base, Jane Corbin, 8/02,
p. 147] US investigators later call him bin Laden's "right hand man."
[New York
Times, 9/29/01] However, the FBI is unwilling to
brief their German counterparts on what they know about Salim and al-Qaeda,
despite learning much that could have been useful as part of their
investigation into the US embassy bombings. [The Base, Jane Corbin,
8/02, pp. 148-149] By the end of the year, German
investigators learn that Salim had a Hamburg bank account. [New York
Times, 9/29/01] The cosignatory on the account is
businessman Mamoun Darkazanli (see September 24, 2001), whose home
number had been programmed into Salim's cell phone. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02] German authorities had begun to suspect Darkazanli of
terrorist money laundering in 1996. Wadih El-Hage, a former personal secretary
to bin Laden, is also arrested in the wake of the embassy bombings. El-Hage had
created a number of shell companies as fronts for al-Qaeda terrorist
activities, and one of these uses the address of Darkazanli's apartment. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02] Darkazanli's phone number and
Deutschebank account number are also found in El-Hage's address book. [CNN,
10/16/01] Based on these new connections,
investigators ask a federal prosecutor for permission to open a formal
investigation against Darkazanli. An investigation
begins, at the insistence of the US, though Germany has claimed the request for
the investigation was rejected (see December 1999). [AFP, 10/28/01,
New
York Times, 1/18/03] German investigators also learn of a
connection between Salim and Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who is already identified
by police as a suspected extremist (see March 1997). [AP, 6/22/02, New
York Times, 1/18/03]
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October
1998: FBI agents Robert Wright and John Vincent are tracking
a terrorist cell in Chicago, but are told to simply follow suspects around town
and file reports. The two agents believe some of the money used to finance the
1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998) leads back to
Chicago and Saudi multimillionaire
businessman Yassin al-Qadi (see also March 21, 2000 and October 12, 2002). Supervisors try, but temporarily fail, to halt the investigation
into al-Qadi's possible terrorist connections. However, at this time, a
supervisor prohibits Wright and Vincent from making any arrests connected to
the bombings, or opening new criminal investigations. Even though they believe
their case is growing stronger, in January 2001 Wright is told that the Chicago
case is being closed and that "it's just better to let sleeping dogs
lie" (see Late January 2001). Wright tells
ABC: "Those dogs weren't sleeping, they were training, they were getting
ready. ... September the 11th is a direct result of the incompetence of the
FBI's International Terrorism Unit. ... Absolutely no doubt about that."
Chicago federal prosecutor Mark Flessner, also working on the case, says there
"were powers bigger than I was in the Justice Department and within the
FBI that simply were not going to let [the building of a criminal case]
happen." Wright will write an internal FBI memo slamming the FBI in June
2001 (see June
9, 2001, and also May
30, 2002 and August
9, 2002 (C)). Al-Qadi is named in a March 2000
affidavit as a source of terrorist funds in Chicago. [ABC,
11/26/02, ABC,
12/19/02, ABC,
12/19/02 (B)] He is also on secret US and UN lists of major al-Qaeda
financiers (see November 26, 2002). His charity,
the Muwafaq Foundation, is allegedly an al-Qaeda front which transferred
$820,000 to the Palestinian group Hamas through a Muslim foundation called the
Quranic Literacy Institute; the date of the transfer has not been released. [CNN,
10/15/01] Al-Qadi says he shut down Muwafaq in 1996, but the charity has
received money from the United Nations since then. [BBC, 10/20/01,
CNN,
10/15/01]
October-November 1998: US intelligence learns that al-Qaeda is trying to establish a
terrorist cell within the US. There are indications they might be trying to
recruit US citizens. In the next month, there is information that a cell is
attempting to recruit a group of five to seven young men from the US to travel
to the Middle East for training. This is part of a plan to strike a US domestic
target. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
October 8, 1998: The FAA issues the first of three warnings to the nation's
airports and airlines urging a ''high degree of vigilance'' against threats to
US civil aviation from al-Qaeda. It specifically warns against a possible
terrorist hijacking ''at a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States.''
The information is based on statements made by bin Laden and other Islamic
leaders and intelligence information following the US cruise missile attacks in
August. All three warnings came in late 1998, well before 9/11. [Boston
Globe, 5/26/02] This report contradicts numerous
later statements by US officials that the US never had any pre-9/11 specific
threats inside the US or involving hijackings (for instance, see September 12, 2001 or May 16, 2002).
Autumn 1998: US intelligence hears of a bin Laden plot involving aircraft in
the New York and Washington areas. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, New York Times,
9/18/02] No more details are known - was
this the 9/11 plot, or something else?
November 1998: US intelligence learns that a Turkish extremist group had planned
a suicide attack. The conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an
airplane packed with explosives into a famous tomb during a government
ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with bin Laden. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
November
1998 (B): Former President George Bush Sr. meets with the bin Laden family on behalf of the
Carlyle Group. The meeting takes place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This is one of
two known meetings (see January
2000). [Sunday Herald,
10/7/01]
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November 1,
1998-February 2001: Mohamed Atta and al-Qaeda terrorists Said Bahaji
and Ramzi bin al-Shibh move into a four bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse,
in Hamburg, Germany and stay there until February 2001 (Atta is already mainly
living in the US well before this time). Investigators believe this move marks
the formation of their Hamburg al-Qaeda terrorist cell. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/27/02, New York Times,
9/10/02] Up to six men at a time live at the apartment, including other
al-Qaeda agents such as hijacker Marwan Alshehhi and cell member Zakariya
Essabar. [New
York Times, 9/15/01] During the 28 months Atta's name is
on the apartment lease, 29 ethnically Middle Eastern or North African men
register the apartment as their home address. [The Cell, John Miller,
Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/14/02, p. 256] From the very beginning, the apartment was officially under
surveillance by German intelligence, because of investigations into businessman
Mamoun Darkazanli that connect to Said Bahaji (see September 20, 1998 and December 1999). [Washington
Post, 10/23/01] They also suspect connections between Bahaji and al-Qaeda
operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar (see March 1997 and February 17, 1999). [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Germans surveil the apartment off and on for months,
and also wiretap Mounir El Motassadeq (see August 1998), an associate of the
apartment-mates who is later put on trial for assisting the 9/11 plot (see August 29, 2002), but they don't
find any indication of suspicious activity. [Chicago
Tribune, 9/5/02] Bahaji is directly surveilled at least for part of 1998,
but German officials have not disclosed when the probe began or ended. That
investigation is dropped for lack of evidence. [AP, 6/22/02, Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] However, certainly
investigators would have found evidence if they looked more thoroughly. For
instance, Zammar, a talkative man who has trouble keeping secrets, is a
frequent visitor to the many late night meetings there. [Chicago
Tribune, 9/5/02, Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02, The Cell, John Miller, Michael Stone and
Chris Mitchell, 8/14/02, pp. 259-260] Another visitor later recalls Atta and
others discussing attacking the US. [Knight
Ridder, 9/9/02] 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is in Hamburg
several times in 1999, and comes to the apartment (see 1999 (K)). But although there was
a $2 million reward for Mohammed since 1998 (see Mid-1996-September
11, 2001), the US apparently fails to tell Germany what it knows
about him. [New
York Times, 11/4/02, Newsweek,
9/4/02] Hijacker Waleed Alshehri also apparently stays there "at
times." [Washington
Post, 9/14/01, Washington
Post, 9/16/01] The CIA also starts monitoring Atta while he is living at
this apartment, and doesn't tell Germany of the surveillance (see January-May 2000). The German government originally claimed they knew little about
the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell before 9/11, and said nothing directed them towards
the Marienstrasse apartment, which is clearly incorrect. [Telegraph,
11/24/01]
November 4, 1998: The
US formally charges bin Laden with the US embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania, and announce a record $5 million reward for information leading to
his arrest. [PBS
Frontline, 2001] Shortly thereafter, bin Laden allocates $9 million in
reward money for each assassination of four “top” intelligence
agency officers. Before 9/11 it is learned that the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, FBI Director and CIA Director are the targets. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, MSNBC, 9/18/02]
December 1, 1998: A US intelligence assessment: "[bin Laden] is actively
planning against US targets... Multiple reports indicate [he] is keenly
interested in striking the US on its own soil... al-Qaeda is recruiting
operatives for attacks in the US but has not yet identified potential
targets." Later in the month, a classified document signed by a senior US
official states: "The intelligence community has strong indications that
bin Laden intends to conduct or sponsor attacks inside the US." [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Washington
Post, 9/19/02]
December 4, 1998: CIA
Director Tenet issues a "declaration of war" on al-Qaeda, in a
memorandum circulated in the intelligence community. This is 10 months after bin Laden's fatwa on the US,
which is called a "de facto declaration of war" by a senior US
official in 1999 (see February
22, 1998). Tenet says, "We must now enter a new phase in
our effort against bin Laden ... each day we all acknowledge that retaliation
is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously
experienced... We are at war... I want no resources or people spared in this
efforts [sic], either inside CIA or the [larger intelligence] community." Yet a Congressional joint committee later finds that few FBI
agents had ever heard of the declaration. Tenet's fervor did not "reach
the level in the field that is critical so [FBI agents] know what their
priorities are." And even as the counterterrorism budget continues to grow
generally, there is no massive shift in budget or personnel until after 9/11.
For example, the number of CIA personnel assigned to the Counter-Terrorism
Center (CTC) stays roughly constant until 9/11 then nearly doubles from
approximately 400 to approximately 800 in the wake of 9/11. The number of CTC
analysts focusing on al-Qaeda rises from three in 1999 to five by 9/11. [New York Times,
9/18/02, Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
December
5, 1998: In the wake of the al-Qaeda US
embassy attacks (see August 7, 1998), the US gives up
on putting a pipeline through Afghanistan. Unocal announces its
withdrawing from the CentGas pipeline consortium, and closing three of its four
offices in Central Asia. A concern that Clinton will lose support among
women voters for upholding the Taliban also plays a role in the
cancellation. [New York Times,
12/5/98] FTW
December 21, 1998: In a Time magazine cover story entitled "The Hunt for
Osama," it is reported intelligence sources "have evidence that bin
Laden may be planning his boldest move yet - a strike on Washington or possibly
New York City in an eye-for-an-eye retaliation. 'We've hit his headquarters,
now he hits ours,' says a State Department aide." [Time, 12/21/98]
Late 1998: An
al-Qaeda operative involved in the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi is
captured and interrogated by the FBI. The FBI learns of a safe house telephone
number in Yemen, owned by bin Laden associate Ahmed Al-Hada, hijacker Khalid
Almihdhar's father-in-law. [Newsweek,
6/2/02] US intelligence taps the phone line and learns the safe house is an
al-Qaeda "logistics center" used by agents around the world to
communicate with each other and plan attacks. [Newsweek,
6/2/02] It has been revealed that even bin Laden, from 1996 to 1998 (the
two years he had a traced satellite phone), called the safe house dozens of
times. [Sunday
Times, 3/24/02, Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02] In late 1999 the phone line will lead the CIA to an
important al-Qaeda "summit" in Malaysia. [Newsweek,
6/2/02] It appears al-Qaeda was still using the phone line until a
government raid in February 2002. [CBS
News, 2/13/02] What else was learned from this phone and why didn't
monitoring of this phone expose the 9/11 attack?
Late 1998 (B): During the investigation of the 1998 embassy bombings, FBI counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill finds a memo by
al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef on a computer. The memo shows that bin
Laden's group has a keen interest in and detailed knowledge of negotiations
between the Taliban and the US over an oil and gas pipeline through
Afghanistan. Atef's analysis suggests that the Taliban are not sincere in
wanting a pipeline, but are dragging out negotiations to keep Western powers at
bay. [Salon,
6/5/02]
Late 1998 (C): FBI counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill and his team
investigating the 1998 embassy bombings are repeatedly frustrated by the Saudi
government. Guillaume Dasquié, one of the authors of Bin Laden: The
Forbidden Truth, later tells the Village Voice: "We uncovered
incredible things... Investigators would arrive to find that key witnesses they
were about to interrogate had been beheaded the day before." [Village Voice,
1/2/02, Bin
Laden: The Forbidden Truth, released 11/11/01 (the link is an excerpt
containing Chapter 1)]
Late 1998 (D):
President Clinton signs a directive authorizing the CIA to plan an
assassination of bin Laden. The CIA draw up detailed profiles of bin Laden's
daily routines, where he sleeps, and his travel arrangements. The assassination never happens, supposedly because of
inadequate intelligence. But, as one officer later says, "you can keep
setting the bar higher and higher, so that nothing ever gets done." An
officer who helped draw up the plans says, "We were ready to move"
but "we were not allowed to do it because of this stubborn policy of risk
avoidance... It is a disgrace." [Philadelphia
Inquirer, 9/16/01]
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Late 1998 (E):
Intelligence agents learn that Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs) - head of
Islamic Jihad and one of the top three leaders of al-Qaeda [ABC
News, 11/17/01], is staying in a particular hotel room in Khartoum, Sudan.
White House officials ask that Atef be killed or captured and interrogated. The CIA puts the operation in the "too hard to do
box," according to one former official. A plan is eventually made to seize
him, but by then he has left the country. [New
York Times, 12/30/01] Atef is considered a top planner of the 9/11 attacks
(see Before September 11, 2001 (D)),
and is later killed in a bombing raid (see November 15, 2001 (B)).
Late
1998 (F): The failed August 1998 US missile attack against
bin Laden (see August 20, 1998) greatly elevates
bin Laden's stature in the Muslim world. A US defense analyst
later states, "I think that raid really helped elevate bin Laden's
reputation in a big way, building him up in the Muslim world.... My sense is
that because the attack was so limited and incompetent, we turned this guy into
a folk hero." [Washington
Post, 10/3/01] An Asia Times article published just
prior to 9/11 suggests that because of the failed attack, "a very strong
Muslim lobby emerge[s] to protect [bin Laden's] interests. This includes Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, as well as senior Pakistani generals. Prince Abdullah has good relations with bin Laden as both are
disciples of slain Doctor Abdullah Azzam." [Asia Times, 8/22/01] In early 1999, Pakistani President Musharraf complains that by
demonizing bin Laden, the US has turned him into a cult figure and hero. The US
decides to play down the importance of bin Laden. [UPI,
6/14/01]
Late
1998-January 2001: The US permanently stations two submarines in the
Indian Ocean, ready to hit al-Qaeda with cruise missiles on short notice. Six
to ten hours advance warning is now needed to review the decision, program the
cruise missiles and have them reach their target. On at least three occasions,
spies in Afghanistan report bin Laden's location with information suggesting he
would remain there for some time. Each time, Clinton approves the strike. Each time, CIA Director Tenet says the information is not
reliable enough and the attack cannot go forward. [Washington
Post, 12/19/01, New
York Times, 12/30/01] The submarines are removed shortly after President
Bush takes office (see Late
January 2001 (B)).
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1999: Zacarias
Moussaoui, living in London, is observed by French intelligence making several
trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan. French investigators later claim the British
spy agency MI5 was alerted and requested to place Moussaoui under surveillance.
The request appears to have been ignored. [Independent,
12/11/01]
1999 (B): The FBI
creates its own unit to focus specifically on bin Laden, three years after the
CIA created such a special unit. By 9/11, 17-19 people are working in this
unit, out of over 11,000 FBI staff. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] Why so late, and so
few people?
1999 (C): MI6, the British intelligence agency, gives a secret report
to liaison staff at the US embassy in London. The reports states that
al-Qaeda has plans to use "commercial aircraft" in
"unconventional ways", "possibly as flying bombs." [Sunday
Times, 6/9/02]
1999 (D): The CIA finds an abandoned airstrip in Afghanistan, and makes plans
to use it to evacuate a captured bin Laden, take agents in and out, and similar
purposes. It is speculated that this is the
same airstrip occupied and used as a base of operations early in the later
Afghan war. [Washington
Post, 12/19/01]
1999 (F): A joint project run by the CIA and NSA slips into Afghanistan
and places listening devices within range of al-Qaeda's tactical radios. [Washington
Post, 12/19/01] If all of al-Qaeda's communications
was being monitored, why was bin Laden never captured or killed and apparently
no hints of the 9/11 plot revealed?
1999 (G):
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly asks about having a
"boots on the ground" option to kill bin Laden, using the elite Delta
Force. Joint Chiefs of Staff head Shelton says he wants
"nothing to do" with such an idea. He calls it naive, and ridicules
it as "going Hollywood." [Washington
Post, 12/19/01] Nonetheless, plans to have Delta Force members swoop into
Afghanistan and grab bin Laden are eventually drawn up, but never used. [Time, 8/4/02]
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1999 (H): Diane
and John Albritton later say they call the CIA and police this year several
times to report suspicious activity at a neighbor's home, but authorities fail
to respond. [MSNBC,
9/23/01, New York
Daily News, 9/15/01] Hijacker Waleed Alshehri is renting the house on Orrin
Street in Vienna, Virginia at the time (three blocks from a CIA headquarters).
[AP, 9/15/01]
He makes his neighbors nervous. "There were always people coming and
going," said Diane Albritton. "Arabic people. Some of them never
uttered a word; I don't know if they spoke English. But they looked very
focused. We thought they might be dealing drugs, or illegal immigrants." [New York Times, 9/15/01]
Ahmed Alghamdi lived at the same address until July 2000. [Fox News,
6/6/02, World Net
Daily, 9/14/01] Waleed Alshehri lived with Ahmed Alghamdi in Florida for
seven months in 1997. [Telegraph,
9/20/01] Albritton says they observed a van parked outside the home at all
hours of the day and night. A Middle-Eastern man appeared to be monitoring a
scanner or radio inside the van. Another neighbor says, "We thought it was
a drug house. All the cars parked on the street were new BMWs, new Mercedes.
People were always walking around out front with cellphones." There were
frequent wild parties, numerous complaints to authorities, and even a police
report about a woman shooting a gun into the air during a party. [World Net
Daily, 9/14/01, note that this is a highly partisan publication] Other neighbors also called the police about the house. [AP, 9/14/01]
"Critics say [the case] could have made a difference [in stopping 9/11]
had it been handled differently." Standard procedures require CIA to
notify FBI of such domestic information. But FBI officials have not been able
to find any record that the CIA shared the information. [Fox News,
6/6/02] FBI Director Mueller
has said "the hijackers did all they could to stay below our radar."
[Senate
Judiciary Statement, 5/8/02] Does this sound like extremely religious
"sleepers" successfully blending in?
1999 (I): CIA Director Tenet later claims that in this year, the CIA
establishes a network of agents throughout Afghanistan and other countries aimed
at capturing bin Laden and his deputies. [UPI, 10/17/02]
Tenet states that by 9/11, "a map would show that these collection
programs and human networks were in place in such numbers to nearly cover
Afghanistan. This array meant that, when the military campaign to topple the
Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda began [in October 2001], we were able to support
it with an enormous body of information and a large stable of assets." [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
1999 (J): The
London Times later claims that British intelligence secretly offers 9/11 paymaster Saeed Sheikh, imprisoned in India (see November
1994-December 1999) for kidnapping Britons and Americans (see June
1993-October 1994), an amnesty and the ability to "live in London
a free man" if he will reveal his links to al-Qaeda. He apparently
refuses. [Daily
Mail, 7/16/02, London
Times, 7/16/02] Yet after he is rescued in a hostage
swap deal (see December
24-31, 1999), the press reports that he, in fact, is freely able to
return to Britain. [Press Trust of
India, 1/3/00] He visits his parents there in 2000 and again in early 2001.
[Vanity
Fair, 8/02, BBC,
7/16/02, Telegraph,
7/16/02] He is not charged with kidnapping until well after 9/11 (see November
2001-February 5, 2002). Those kidnapped by Saeed call the
government's decision not to try him a "disgrace" and
"scandalous." [Press Trust of
India, 1/3/00] The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review later suggests that
not only is Saeed closely tied to both the ISI and al-Qaeda, but may also have
been working for the CIA: "There are many in Musharraf's government who
believe that Saeed Sheikh's power comes not from the ISI, but from his
connections with our own CIA. The theory is that ... Saeed Sheikh was bought
and paid for." [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] Did or does Saeed have some kind of deal with
British or US intelligence?
1999 (K): 9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed "repeatedly" visits Mohamed Atta
and others in the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. [AP, 8/24/02]
US and German officials say a number of sources place Mohammed at Atta's
Hamburg apartment. It isn't clear when he visits or who he visits. [Los Angeles
Times, 6/6/02, New
York Times, 11/4/02] However, it would be logical that he at least visits
Atta's housemate Ramzi bin al-Shibh, since investigators believe he is the
"key contact between the pilots" and Mohammed. [Los Angeles
Times, 1/27/03] Mohammed is living in Germany at the time. [New York Times,
9/22/02] German intelligence surveil the
apartment in 1999 but apparently don't notice Mohammed (see November
1, 1998-February 2001). US investigators have
been searching for Mohammed since 1996 (see January-May
1996), but apparently never tell the Germans what they know about
him. [New
York Times, 11/4/02] Even after 9/11, German investigators complain that US
investigators don't tell them what they know about Mohammed living in Germany
until they read it in the newspapers in June 2002. [New York Times,
6/11/02]
Early 1999: State
Department counterterrorism coordinator Michael Sheehan writes a memo calling
for a new approach in containing bin Laden. He urges a series of actions the US
could take toward Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Yemen to persuade them to help isolate al-Qaeda. He calls Pakistan the key country and urges that terrorism be
made the central issue with them. He advises the US to work will all
these countries to curb money laundering. However, a former
official says Sheehan's plan lands "with a resounding thud." Pakistan
continues to "feign cooperation but [does] little" about its support
for the Taliban. [New
York Times, 10/29/01]
February 1999: A classified report discusses
responses to an anthrax attack through the mail. The report, precipitated by a
series of false anthrax mailings, is written by William Patrick, inventor of
the US anthrax weaponization process, under a CIA contract. [New York Times,
12/3/01] The report was commissioned by Steven Hatfill, a good friend of
Patrick. [Baltimore
Sun, 6/27/02] The report describes what the US military could do and what a
terrorist might be able to achieve. [New York Times,
12/3/01] The similarities between what the report predicted and the anthrax
attacks that eventually happen after 9/11 are startling. The BBC later
suggests the "possibility that there was a secret CIA project to
investigate methods of sending anthrax through the mail which went madly out of
control" and that the anthrax attacker knew of this study or took part in
it. The CIA and William Patrick deny the existence of this
report, even though copies have been leaked to the media. [BBC,
3/14/02, Baltimore
Sun, 6/27/02]
February 1999 (B): There is another hoax anthrax attack. A
handful of envelopes with almost identical messages are sent to a combination
of media and government targets including The Washington Post, NBC's Atlanta
office, a post office in Columbus, Georgia (next to Fort Benning, an Army
base), and the Old Executive Office Building in Washington. The letters
contained fake anthrax powder. "That's interesting because as of 1997, US
bio-defense scientists were working basically only with wet anthrax, while by
1999 some had experimented with making powders." The New York Times later
suggests that Steven Hatfill could have been behind this attack and the one in
1997 (see April 24, 1997). [New
York Times, 7/12/02] Could there be a connection between this hoax and a
classified CIA report about sending anthrax through the mail released the same
month (see February
1999)?
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February
17, 1999: German intelligence is periodically tapping
suspected al-Qaeda terrorist Mohammed Haydar Zammar's telephone (see March 1997 and September 21, 1999), and on this
day investigators hear a caller being told Zammar is at a meeting with
"Mohamed, Ramzi and Said," and could be reached at the phone number
of the Marienstrasse apartment where all three of them live. This refers to
Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Said Bahaji. But apparently the German police fail to grasp its importance
of these names, even though Said Bahaji is also under investigation (see November 1, 1998-February 2001). [AP, 6/22/02, New
York Times, 1/18/03] Atta's last name is given as well. Agents check
the phone number and confirm the street address, but it isn't known what they
make of the information. [Der
Spiegel, 2/3/03]
March 1999: US intelligence learns of plans by an al-Qaeda member who is also
a US citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and
then detonate the explosives he is carrying. The individual, who received hang
glider training in the US, brings a hang glider back to Afghanistan, but
various problems arise during the testing of the glider. This unnamed person is
subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
March 3, 1999: Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, before the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: "There appears to be
general agreement concerning the need to transform the US military into a
significantly different kind of force from that which emerged victorious from
the Cold and Gulf Wars. Yet this verbal support has not been translated into a
defense program supporting transformation ... the "critical mass"
needed to effect it has not yet been achieved. One may conclude that, in the
absence of a strong external shock to the United States - a latter-day 'Pearl
Harbor' of sorts - surmounting the barriers to transformation will likely prove
a long, arduous process." [CSBA,
3/5/99] This comment echoes other strategists who wait for a second Pearl
Harbor to fulfill their visions (see October 1997 and September
2000).
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April
1999: A Saudi government audit shows that five of Saudi
Arabia's billionaires have been giving tens of millions of dollars to al-Qaeda.
The audit shows that these businessmen transferred money from the National
Commercial Bank to accounts of Islamic charities in London and banks in New York that serve as fronts for bin Laden. $3 million was
diverted from a Saudi pension fund. [USA Today,
10/29/99] $2 billion of the bank's $21 billion is also found to be missing.
The only action taken is that Khalid bin Mahfouz, founder of National
Commercial Bank, Saudi Arabia's biggest bank, is placed under house arrest and majority
control in the bank is bought out by the Saudi government. [Ottawa
Citizen, 9/29/01] The Saudi government won't allow US officials to talk to
bin Mahfouz, despite asking "at a very senior level." [Washington
Post, 2/17/02] By 9/11, he is in a hospital and technically no longer under
house arrest. The US has not frozen the accounts of
bin Mahfouz, and he continues to engage in major oil deals with US corporations
(see Early
December 2001 (B)). Forbes Magazine claims his family
fortune is worth more than $4 billion. [Boston
Herald, 10/14/01, Boston
Herald, 12/10/01] Bin Mahfouz had invested in George Bush Jr.'s businesses
starting in 1988 (see 1988). He is later sued for his
role in funding terrorism (see August 15, 2002).
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April 1, 1999: Ziad
Jarrah has an unofficial wedding with his girlfriend, Aisel Senguen. What's
interesting is a photo apparently taken by Jarrah at the wedding, shown here.
German intelligence found the photo several days after 9/11. An undercover
agent was able to immediately identify 10 of the 18 men in the photo, as well
as where it was taken: the prayer room of Hamburg's Al-Quds mosque. The
informant was also able to identify which of them attended Mohamed Atta's study
group. This informant knew even "seemingly trivial details" of some
of the men, showing that "probably almost all members of the Hamburg
terror cell" had been watched by German state intelligence since this
time, if not before. The head of the state intelligence
had previously maintained that they knew nothing of any of these men, and had
no informant. [FAZ,
2/2/03]
Spring 1999: US intelligence learns of a planned bin Laden attack on a US
government facility in Washington (which facility has not been made public). [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, New York Times,
9/18/02]
Spring 1999
(B): Randy Glass is a con artist turned government informant participating
in a sting called Operation Diamondback. [Palm
Beach Post, 9/29/01] He discusses an illegal weapons deal with an Egyptian
American named Mohamed el Amir. In wiretapped conversations, Mohamed discusses
the need to get false papers to disguise a shipment of illegal weapons. His
brother, Dr. Magdy el Amir, has been a wealthy neurologist in Jersey City for
the past twenty years. Two other weapons dealers later convicted in a sting
operation involving Glass also lived in Jersey City, and both el Amirs admit
knowing one of them, Diaa Mohsen (see June
12, 2001). Mohsen has been paid at least once by Dr. el Amir. In
1998, Congressman Ben Gilman was given a foreign intelligence report suggesting
that Dr. el Amir owns an HMO that is secretly funded by bin Laden, and that
money is being skimmed from the HMO to fund terrorist activities. The state of
New Jersey later buys the HMO and determines that $15 million were unaccounted
for and much of that has been diverted into hard-to-trace offshore bank
accounts. However, investigators working with
Glass are never given the report about Dr. el Amir. Both el Amirs have not been
charged with any crime. Mohamed now lives in Egypt and Magdy continues to
practice medicine in New Jersey. Glass's sting, which began in late 1998, will
uncover many interesting leads before ending in June 2001 (see also July
14, 1999, Early August 2001 and August 2, 2002). [MSNBC, 8/2/02]
June 1999: Enron announces an agreement to build a $140 million
power plant in the Gaza Strip. One of the major financers for the
project comes from the Saudi Binladin Group, a company owned by Osama's
family. This is the second attempted project between these two companies. 90% complete, the construction is halted because of
Palestinian - Israeli violence and then Enron's bankruptcy. [Washington
Post, 3/2/02]
June 1999 (B): In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and in a briefing to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staffers
one month later, the chief of the CTC describes reports that bin Laden and his
associates are planning attacks in the US. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
July 1999-November 2000: Hijacker
Marwan Alshehhi receives about $100,000 from an account in Sharjah, United Arab
Emirates during this time. [Financial
Times, 11/30/01, Newsweek,
12/2/01, Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02] The money is apparently sent by Mohamed
Yousef Mohamed Alqusaidi, believed to be Alshehhi's brother. Alqusaidi had been
sending money to Alshehhi in Germany since at least March 1998. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02] It is not clear if this is money
innocently sent by Alshehhi's rich Arab family or if it is money deliberately
sent for terrorism. Much of the rest of the 9/11 funding also passes through
Sharjah (see June
29, 2000-September 18, 2000, Early
August 2001 (D) and September 8-11, 2001), a town at
the center of illegal al-Qaeda business dealings (see Mid-1996-October
2001).
June 7, 1999: Bin
Laden is added to FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" List. This is almost a year and a half after bin Laden's
"declaration of war" against the US (see February
22, 1998) and about six months after the CIA's "declaration of
war against al-Qaeda (see December 4, 1998). It's also three
years after an internal State Department document connecting bin Laden to
financing and planning numerous terrorist attacks. [PBS
Frontline 10/3/02]
Mid-June
1999: Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, plus would-be hijacker
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and associate Mounir El Motassadeq, hold a meeting in
Amsterdam, Netherlands. All are living in Hamburg at the time, so it's not
clear why they go to meet there, though it's speculated they are meeting
someone. Motassadeq also goes to the town of Eindhoven, Netherlands, on three
occasions, in early 1999, late 1999 and 2001. [AP, 9/13/02] On at least one occasion, Motassadeq receives cash provided by
unnamed "Saudi financiers" that is meant to fund a new Eindhoven
mosque. Investigators believe he uses the money to help
pay for some 9/11 hijacker flying lessons. [Baltimore
Sun, 9/2/02] Alshehhi also flies to Amsterdam from the US in the summer of
2001, but it isn't known why (see April
18, 2001).
July 4, 1999: With the chances of a pipeline deal with the Taliban looking increasingly
unlikely, the US government finally issues an executive order prohibiting
commercial transactions with the Taliban. [Executive Order, 7/4/99]
July 5, 1999: President
Clinton signs an executive order freezing the assets of the Taliban in the US
and prohibiting trade and other transactions between US citizens and the
Taliban. Clinton blames the Taliban for harboring bin Laden. [CNN, 7/6/99]
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July 14, 1999: US
government informant Randy Glass records a conversation at a dinner attended by
him, illegal arms dealers Diaa Mohsen and Mohammed Malik (see June 12, 2001), a former Egyptian
judge named Shireen Shawky, and ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas, held
at a restaurant within view of the WTC. FBI agents pretending to be restaurant
customers sit at nearby tables. [WPBF Channel
25, 8/5/02, MSNBC, 8/2/02]
Abbas says he wants to buy a whole shipload of weapons stolen from the US
military to give to bin Laden. [Cox News,
8/2/02] Abbas points to the WTC and says,
"Those towers are coming down." This ISI agent later makes two other
references to an attack on the WTC. [WPBF Channel
25, 8/5/02, Cox News,
8/2/02, Palm
Beach Post, 10/17/02] Abbas also says, "Americans [are] the
enemy," and, "We would have no problem with blowing up this entire
restaurant because it is full of Americans." [MSNBC, 3/18/03] The
meeting is secretly recorded, and parts are shown on television in 2003 (see
also August 17, 1999). [MSNBC,
3/18/03 (B)]
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August 17,
1999: A group of illegal arms merchants, including an ISI agent with
foreknowledge of 9/11, had met in a New York restaurant the month before (see July 14, 1999). This same group
meets at this time in a West Palm Beach, Florida, warehouse, and is shown
Stinger missiles as part of a sting operation. [South
Florida Sun-Sentinel, 3/20/03] US intelligence soon
discovers connections between two in the group, Rajaa Gulum Abbas and Mohammed
Malik, terrorist groups in Kashmir (where the ISI assists terrorists fighting
against India), and the Taliban. Mohamed Malik suggests in this meeting that
the Stingers will be used in Kashmir or Afghanistan. His colleague Diaa Mohsen
also says Abbas has direct connections to "dignitaries" and bin
Laden. Abbas also wants heavy water for a "dirty bomb" or other
material to make a nuclear weapon. He says he will bring a Pakistani nuclear
scientist to the US to inspect the material. [MSNBC, 8/2/02,
MSNBC, 3/18/03] Government informant Randy Glass passes these warnings on before
9/11, but he claims, "The complaints were ordered sanitized by the highest
levels of government" (see also Early August 2001). [WPBF Channel
25, 8/5/02] In June 2002, the US secretly indicts Abbas (see June
2002), but apparently they aren't trying very hard to find him: In
August 2002, MSNBC is easily able to contact Abbas in Pakistan and speak to him
by telephone. [MSNBC, 8/2/02]
September 1999: BJ's
Wholesale Club, a store in Hollywood, Florida, later tells the FBI that Atta
may have held a BJ's membership card since at least this time ("more than
two years"). Several cashiers at the store vaguely remember seeing Atta
there. [Miami
Herald, 9/18/01] According to the official story,
Atta doesn't arrive in the US until June 3, 2000. [Miami
Herald, 9/22/01]
September
1999 (B): Steven Hatfill, later suspected of
being behind the 2001 anthrax attacks (see October 4, 2001), ends his
two-year contract working at USAMRIID. But his contact held little meaning
after February, when he had started working full time somewhere else. [Weekly
Standard, 9/16/02] It is later reported that the strain
of anthrax used in the attacks could be no older than September 1999. [New York Times,
6/23/02] While at USAMRIID, Hatfill also worked on virology in a different
building than where anthrax was studied, so the odds of Hatfill getting access
to the type of anthrax used in the attacks at USAMRIID seems extremely small. [Weekly
Standard, 9/16/02]
September 1999 (C): A report prepared for US intelligence entitled the "Sociology
and Psychology of Terrorism" is completed. It states:
"Al-Qaeda's expected retaliation for the US cruise missile attack ...
could take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation's
capital. Al-Qaeda could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a
federal building. Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaeda's Martyrdom Battalion
could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and Semtex) into
the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the
White House. Whatever form an attack may take, bin Laden will most likely
retaliate in a spectacular way." The report is by the National
Intelligence Council, which advises the President and US intelligence on
emerging threats. [AP,
4/18/02, read the complete
report on-line] The Bush administration later claims
to have never heard of this report until May 2002, despite the fact that it had
been publicly posted on the internet since 1999, and "widely shared within
the government" according to the New York Times. [CNN, 5/18/02,
New York
Times, 5/18/02]
September 1999 (D): US intelligence obtains information that bin Laden and others are
planning a terrorist act in the US, possibly against specific landmarks in
California and New York City. The reliability of the source is unknown. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
September
1999 (E): FBI agents visit the Airman Flight
School in Norman, Oklahoma to investigate Ihab Ali, who attended the school in
1993 and was named as an unindicted
co-conspirator in the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya. [CNN,
10/16/01, Boston
Globe, 9/18/01, Senate
Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] It's not known if
those investigators were aware of a flight school warning given by the Oklahoma
FBI in 1998 (see May 18, 1998). Hijackers Atta and
Marwan Alshehhi later visit Airman in July 2000 but ultimately decide to train
in Florida instead. [Boston
Globe, 9/18/01] Zacarias Moussaoui takes flight lessons at Airman in 2001
(see February 23, 2001).
September
15, 1999: The first phase of the US Commission on
National Security/21st Century, co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D) and
Warren Rudman (R) is issued. It concludes: "America will be attacked by
terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and Americans will lose their
lives on American soil, possibly in large numbers" (see also January 31, 2001). [download the
complete report here: USCNS
Reports]
September
21, 1999: German intelligence is periodically tapping
suspected al-Qaeda terrorist Mohammed Haydar Zammar's telephone (see also March 1997 and February
17, 1999), and on this day investigators hear Zammar call hijacker
Marwan Alshehhi. Officials initially claim that the
call also mentions hijacker Mohamed Atta, but only his first name. [Telegraph,
11/24/01, New
York Times, 1/18/03] But in fact, his full name,
"Mohammed Atta Al Amir," is mentioned in this call and in another
recorded call. [FAZ, 2/2/03]
Alshehhi, living in the United Arab Emirates at the time, calls Zammar
frequently. German intelligence asks the United Arab Emirates to identify the
number and the caller, but the request is not answered. [Der
Spiegel, 2/3/03]
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October 1999: The
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security is founded. This institute claims to be
"leading the [homeland security] debate through executive-level education,
public awareness programs, workshops for policy makers and online publications:
a weekly newsletter and the Journal of Homeland Security, which features
articles by senior government leaders and leading homeland security
experts." As their webpage makes clear, the first mention of the phrase
"homeland security" in a US context came only one month earlier. This
institute, which has deep roots in the Air Force, has received tens of millions
of government dollars in support. [Online
Journal, 6/29/02] They talked about a "second Pearl Harbor" long
before 9/11. Doesn't this institute indicate the Department of Homeland
Security was planned long before 9/11? Their own website touts
their role in the creation of this department, but the media has completely
failed to cover the story. [Institute
for Homeland Security website, Institute
for Homeland Security website FAQ, and, though it's a partisan website, the
only reporting on this has been at the Online
Journal, 6/29/02]
October 1999 (B): The CIA readies an operation to capture or kill bin Laden,
secretly training and equipping approximately 60 commandos from the ISI.
Pakistan supposedly agrees to this plan in return for the lifting of economic
sanctions and more economic aid. The plan is ready to go by this month, but it
is aborted because on October 12, General Musharraf takes control of Pakistan
in a coup (see October 12, 1999). Musharraf
refuses to continue the operation despite the promise of substantial rewards. [Washington
Post, 10/3/01] Some US officials later say the CIA
was tricked, because the ISI just feigned to cooperate as a stalling tactic,
and never intended to get bin Laden. [New
York Times, 10/29/01]
October 5, 1999: The highly respected Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor reports
that US intelligence is worried bin Laden is planning a major terrorist attack
on US soil. They are said to be particularly concerned about some kind of attack
on New York, and they have recommended stepped-up security at the New York
Stock Exchange and the Federal Reserve. [NewsMax,
10/5/99]
October
12, 1999: General Musharraf becomes leader of Pakistan in a
coup. One major reason for the coup is the ISI felt the
previous ruler had to go "out of fear that he might buckle to American
pressure and reverse Pakistan's policy [of supporting] the Taliban." [New
York Times, 12/8/01] Shortly thereafter Musharraf replaces the leader of
the ISI, Brig Imtiaz, because of his close ties to the
previous leader. Imtiaz is arrested and convicted of "having assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income." It comes out that he was
keeping tens of millions of dollars earned from heroin smuggling in a
Deutschebank account. This is interesting because insider trading just prior to
9/11 will later connect to a branch of Deutschebank recently run by
"Buzzy" Krongard, now Executive Director of the CIA (see September 6-10, 2001). [Financial
Times (Asian edition), 8/10/01] The new Director of the ISI is Lt. Gen.
Mahmood Ahmed, a close ally of Musharraf who is instrumental in the success of
the coup. [Guardian,
10/9/01] Mahmood will later be fired after suggestions that he helped fund
the 9/11 attacks (see October 7, 2001 (B)).
November
1999: Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar enter the US and
begin living in San Diego [Washington
Post, 9/30/01, San
Diego Channel 10, 10/5/01, Newsweek,
6/2/02] (some reports have them in the US even earlier [Wall Street
Journal, 9/17/01, Las
Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01]). Alhazmi's name is on an apartment lease
beginning in November 1999. [Washington
Post, 10/01] However, FBI Director Mueller has
stated the two first arrived on January 15, 2000 after an important meeting in
Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and many news
reports concur. [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02] It has been reported however, that shortly
before 9/11 the CIA determined the two were in Los Angeles around Jan 1, 2000,
before the meeting. [AP, 9/21/02 (B)] In early
1999, the NSA intercepted communications mentioning the name Nawaf Alhazmi. [AP, 9/25/02] The NSA Director later states that by
the time of the Malaysia meeting, the hijackers Nawaf, his brother Salem and
Almihdhar were all to al-Qaeda, "in our sights," known to be
associated with al-Qaeda "and we shared this information with the
(intelligence) community." [Copley
News, 10/17/02, NSA
Director Congressional Testimony, 10/17/02] Shouldn't all three have
been put on a terrorist watch list even before two of them first arrived in the
US in November 1999?
November 1999
(B): As hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar enter the US for the
first time (see November
1999), they are met at the Los Angeles International Airport by a
Saudi man named Omar al-Bayoumi (see June
1998 (D)). Al-Bayoumi later claims that he didn't know Alhazmi and
Almihdhar, but happens to overhear them speaking Arabic in the airport
restaurant, introduces himself and begins helping them. He drives them to San
Diego, arranges for them to live in an apartment a few doors away in the same
apartment building, guarantees the lease and pays $1,550 in cash to cover the
first two months rent. He also helps them open a bank account, obtain car
insurance, get Social Security cards and call flight schools in Florida. [Newsweek, 11/24/02, Washington
Post, 12/29/01, Sunday
Mercury, 10/21/01] Alhazmi and Almihdhar may have reimbursed al-Bayoumi for
the rent money later the same day. [Los Angeles
Times, 11/24/02] Al-Bayoumi is arrested after 9/11, but released after one
week (see September
22, 2001). Some FBI officials later suggest that
al-Bayoumi was an al-Qaeda agent, and the possibility that the Saudi government
may have funded him creates headlines in November 2002 (see November
22, 2002). Note that there is some discrepancy as to when
Alhazmi and Almihdhar first entered the US; most media report January 2000
(after an important al-Qaeda meeting that they attend in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000)), but some
report November 1999 (for instance, Los Angeles
Times, 11/24/02]). Since Alhazmi's name appears on a San Diego apartment
lease in November 1999, it is hard to see how they could have arrived later
than that. [Washington
Post, 10/01]
November
3, 1999: The head of Australia's security
services admits that the Echelon global surveillance system exists (see August 12, 1988); the US still
denies its existence. The BBC describes Echelon's power as
"astounding," and elaborates: "Every international telephone
call, fax, e-mail, or radio transmission can be listened to by powerful
computers capable of voice recognition. They home in on a long list of key
words, or patterns of messages. They are looking for evidence of international
crime, like terrorism." [BBC, 11/3/99]
November
14, 1999: United Nations sanctions against Afghanistan take
effect. The sanctions freeze Taliban assets and impose an air embargo on Ariana
airlines in an effort to force the Taliban to hand over bin Laden. [BBC, 2/6/00] However, Ariana keeps its illegal trade network flying (see Mid-1996-October
2001), and is grounded in early 2001 only when additional sanctions
against Ariana take effect (see January 19, 2001).
November 29, 1999: The United Nations Drug Control Programme has determined the ISI
makes around $2.5 billion annually from the sale of illegal drugs. [Times of India,
11/29/99]
November
30, 1999: Jordanian officials successfully uncover an
al-Qaeda plot to blow up the Radisson Hotel in Amman, Jordan and other sites on
January 1, 2000 (see also 1989-May
2000). [PBS
Frontline 10/3/02] A call between al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah and a
suspected Jordanian terrorist exposes the plot. In the call, Zubaydah states,
"The grooms are ready for the big wedding." [Seattle
Times, 6/23/02] This call reflects an extremely poor code system, because
the FBI already determined in the wake of the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998) that
"wedding" was the al-Qaeda code word for bomb. [The Cell, John
Miller, Michael Stone and Chris Mitchell, 8/02, p. 214] Furthermore, it appears
al-Qaeda fails to later change their code system, because the codename for the
9/11 attack is also "The Big Wedding." [Chicago
Tribune, 9/5/02] US intelligence claims it failed
to understand the code language for the 9/11 attacks.
Late November 1999:
Investigators believe hijackers Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and Ziad Jarrah and
associates Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Said Bahaji (all members of the same Hamburg,
Germany cell) arrive separately in Afghanistan around this time. They meet with
bin Laden and train for several months. [CBS,
10/9/02, New
York Times, 9/10/02] In a 2002 interview with Al Jazeera,
bin al-Shibh says "We had a meeting attended by all four pilots including
Nawaf Alhazmi, Atta's right-hand man." The Guardian interprets this to
mean that Alhazmi flew Flight 77, not Hani Hanjour as popularly believed. [Guardian,
9/9/02]
December
1999: The CIA begins "persistent" efforts to recruit German
businessman Mamoun Darkazanli (see September 24, 2001) as an
informer. Darkazanli knows Atta and the other members of the Hamburg al-Qaeda
cell. In late 1998, German intelligence had begun an investigation into
Darkazanli (see September 20, 1998). Agents
occasionally followed him, but Darkazanli obviously noticed the trail on him at
least once. More costly and time-consuming electronic surveillance is not done
however, and by the end of 1999 the investigation has produced little of value.
German law does not allow foreign governments to have informants in Germany. So, this month the CIA representative in Hamburg
appears at the headquarters of the Hamburg state domestic intelligence agency,
the LFV, responsible for tracking terrorists and domestic extremists. He tells
them the CIA believes Darkazanli had knowledge of an unspecified terrorist plot
and encourages that he be "turned" against his al-Qaeda comrades. A
source later recalls he says, "Darkazanli knows a lot." Efforts to
recruit him continue the next year (see Spring 2000). The CIA has not admitted this interest in Darkazanli. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02]
December
1999 (B): A Yemeni safe house telephone monitored by the FBI
and CIA (see Late 1998), reveals that there
will be an important al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in January 2000, and that
hijacker Khalid Almihdhar and an associate named Nawaf (hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi)
will attend. [Newsweek,
6/2/02, Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] During the next month, the CIA learns that
Nawaf's last name is Alhazmi. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, New York Times,
9/21/02] On Almihdhar's way to Malaysia the CIA learns he has a
multiple-entry visa for the US good until April 6, 2000 (apparently Alhazmi
gets the same type of visa at the same time, but US intelligence does not learn
this until later [Copley
News, 10/17/02]). [PBS Frontline,
10/3/02, Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, New York Times,
9/21/02] Through the safe house connection the
CIA knows Almihdhar is tied to al-Qaeda, and they know he can enter and leave
the US at will, but they don't attempt to find him. Had they tried, they would
have learned he was already living in the US (see November 1999).
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December
4, 1999: Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife
of Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, begins sending monthly
cashier's checks of between $2,000 and $3,500 (accounts differ) to Majeda
Dweikat, the wife of Osama Basnan, a Saudi living in San Diego (see April
1998). Accounts also differ over when the checks were first sent
(between November 1999 and about March 2000, a Saudi government spokesman has
stated December 4 [Fox
News, 11/23/02]). Basnan's wife signs many of the checks over to her friend
Manal Bajadr, the wife of Omar al-Bayoumi. [Washington
Times, 11/26/02, Newsweek,
11/22/02, Newsweek, 11/24/02,
Guardian,
11/25/02] Basnan's wife received some checks while she was living in
Baltimore, Maryland and Falls Church, Virginia. [Washington
Post, 11/24/02] Falls Church is located outside Washington and near CIA
headquarters. It is also where the World Assembly of Muslim Youth [WAMY] - a
suspected terrorist organization - is located. Abdullah bin Laden (Osama's
brother) was the US director of WAMY; he and his brother Omar lived in Falls
Church at the same time as four of the 9/11 hijackers (see 1996). It is believed that
al-Bayoumi helped 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar settle in
San Diego (see November
1999 (B)), and it is later suggested that the money from the wife of
the Saudi ambassador passes through these two as intermediaries and ultimately
ends up in the hands of the two hijackers (see November
22, 2002). The payments from Princess Haifa continue until May 2002
and may total $51,000, or as much as $73,000. [MSNBC, 11/23/02, MSNBC, 11/27/02] While
living in the San Diego area, al-Bayoumi and Basnan are heavily involved in
relocating and offering financial support to Saudi immigrants in the community.
[Los
Angeles Times, 11/24/02] In late 2002, Al-Bayoumi tells an Arabic-language
newspaper in London that he did not pass any money along to the hijackers. [Washington Times,
12/04/02] Basnan is also described as an al-Qaeda sympathizer who called
9/11 "a wonderful, glorious day." [Newsweek, 11/22/02] However, Basnan
has variously claimed to know al-Bayoumi, not know him at all or to know him
only vaguely, [Arab News,
11/26/02, ABC,
11/26/02, ABC,
11/25/02, MSNBC, 11/27/02]
but earlier reports say Basnan and his wife were "very good friends"
of al-Bayoumi and his wife. Both couples lived at the Parkwood Apartments at
the same time as the two hijackers; prior to that, the couples lived together
in a different apartment complex. Also, the two wives were arrested for
shoplifting together at a J. C. Penney in April 2001. [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 10/22/02]
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December 14, 1999: Al-Qaeda
terrorist Ahmed Ressam is arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, attempting to
enter the US with components of explosive devices. 130 pounds of
bomb-making chemicals and detonator components are found inside his rental car. He subsequently admits he planned to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport on December 31, 1999. [New
York Times, 12/30/01] This would have been part of a wave of attacks
against US targets over the New Year's weekend (see also November
30, 1999 and January 3, 2000). He is
later connected to al-Qaeda and convicted, but he still hasn't been formally
sentenced. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, PBS
Frontline 10/3/02]
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December 14-31, 1999: In the
wake of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December
14, 1999), FBI investigators work frantically to uncover more
millennium plots before they are likely to take place at the end of the year.
Documents found with Ressam lead to coconspirators in New York, then Boston and
Seattle. Enough people are arrested to prevent any attacks. National Security
Council Chief of Counterterrorism Richard Clarke later says, "I think a
lot of the FBI leadership for the first time realized that ... there probably were
al-Qaeda people in the United States. They realized that only after they looked
at the results of the investigation of the millennium bombing plot." [PBS
Frontline, 10/3/02] Yet Clinton's National Security
Adviser Sandy Berger says, "Until the very end of our time in office, the
view we received from the [FBI] was that al-Qaeda had limited capacity to
operate in the US and any presence here was under surveillance." No
analysis is done before 9/11 to investigate just how big that presence might
be. [Washington
Post, 9/20/02]
December
20, 1999: The BBC explains one reason why
the Northern Alliance has been able to hold out for so long in its civil war
against the Taliban in Afghanistan: "Iran has stirred up the fighting in
order to make sure an international oil pipeline [goes] through its territory
and not through Afghanistan." [BBC, 12/20/99]
In the summer of 2001 Pakistan and India appear to be leaning towards putting a
gas pipeline through Iran but this plan is apparently canceled after the 9/11
attacks (see June 27, 2001).
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December
24-31, 1999: An Indian Airlines flight is hijacked and flown to
Afghanistan where 155 passengers are held hostage for eight days. They are
freed in return for the release of three militants held in Indian prisons. One
of the hostages is killed. One of the men freed in the exchange
is 9/11 paymaster Saeed Sheikh (see November
1994-December 1999). [BBC, 12/31/99]
Another freed militant is terrorist leader Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar emerges
in Pakistan a few days later, and tells a crowd of 10,000, "I have come
here because this is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace
until we have destroyed America and India." [AP,
1/5/00] He then tours Pakistan for weeks under the protection of the ISI. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02] The ISI and Saeed helps Azhar form a new terrorist group called
Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Azhar is soon plotting terrorist acts again (see October
1, 2001 (D) and December 13, 2001). [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, Washington
Post, 2/8/03]
Late 1999:
Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi report their passports missing, Ziad Jarrah
reports his missing in February 2000. [Sun
Sentinel, 9/28/01, Inside 9-11: What Really Happened, by Der
Spiegel, 2/02, pp. 257-258] Alshehhi has a replacement issued on December 26,
1999. [London
Times, 9/20/01] The common theory is that this was to cover up
incriminating trips to Afghanistan and other places, but could this have been
when they took on new identities?
December 31, 1999-January 1,
2000: The CIA expected five to 15 attacks against American
targets around the world over the New Year's weekend, but none occur. [Time, 8/4/02] Since late 1999, there was intelligence that targets in
Washington and New York would be attacked at this time. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] It's not clear who
they warned or when, but if US intelligence thought terrorists were capable of
so many simultaneous attacks then why (as was claimed after 9/11) have only a
total of 14 fighters been at a state of highest readiness to defend the entire
US since 1997?
2000: The BKA, the German counterpart to
the FBI, prepares an extensive report on al-Qaeda's connections in Germany. The
BKA warns that "unknown structures" are preparing to stage attacks
abroad. However, the German federal
prosecutor's office rejects a proposed follow-up investigation. One of the
persons named in the BKA report supposedly had contacts with the Hamburg terror
group, containing hijackers Atta, Alshehhi and others. [Berliner
Zeitung, 9/24/01]
2000 (B): At some point during this year, an FBI internal memo states
that a Middle Eastern nation has been trying to purchase a flight simulator in
violation of US restrictions. FBI refuses to disclose the date or
details. [Los Angeles
Times, 5/30/02] FTW
2000 (C): During
this year, there are 425 unknowns - pilots who didn't file or diverted from
flight plans or used the wrong frequency. Fighters are scrambled in response
129 times. After 9/11, such scrambles go from about twice a week to three or
four times a day. [Calgary
Herald, 10/13/01] Between September 2000 and June 2001, fighters are
scrambled 67 times. [AP, 8/13/02]
General Ralph E. Eberhart, NORAD Commander in Chief, says that before 9/11,
"Normally, our units fly 4-6 sorties a month in support of the NORAD air
defense mission." [FNS,
10/25/01] Statistics on how many minutes fighters take to scramble
before 9/11 apparently are not released.
2000-September
10, 2001: The names of four hijackers are later discovered in
Philippines immigration records, according to Philippine Immigration
Commissioner Andrea Domingo. However, it hasn't been confirmed if these are the
hijackers, or just other Saudis with the same names. Abdulaziz Alomari visits
the Philippines once in 2000, then again in February 2001, leaving on February
12. [AP,
9/19/01, Telegraph,
9/20/01, Philippines
Daily Inquirer, 9/19/01] Ahmed Alghamdi visits Manila, Philippines more
than 13 times in the two years before 9/11. He leaves the Philippines the day
before the attacks. [Arizona
Daily Star, 9/28/01, Telegraph,
9/20/01] Fayez Ahmed Banihammad visits the Philippines on October 17-19,
2000. [Arizona
Daily Star, 9/28/01, Telegraph,
9/20/01] Saeed Alghamdi visits the Philippines on at least 15 occasions in
2001, entering as a tourist. The last visit ends on August 6, 2001. [Telegraph,
9/20/01] Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi may also have been living in
the Philippines (see 1998-2000), and 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed occasionally stays there (see Early 1994-January 1995). When in the Philippines, it is possible the hijackers meet with
associates of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden's brother-in-law. Khalifa has
been closely linked with the Philippines chapter of the International Islamic
Relief Organization, which gets much of its money from the Saudi Arabian
government and has lately been accused of being a front for al-Qaeda. Amongst
other connections to terrorism, Khalifa helped fund the Islamic Army of Aden, a
group that claimed responsibility for the bombing of the USS Cole. [Boston
Herald, 10/14/01] Khalifa has been connected through phone calls to
Hambali, a major terrorist who attended a planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks
in Malaysia, also attended by two hijackers connected to the Islamic Army of
Aden (see January
5-8, 2000). [PBS
Frontline, 10/3/02, Cox News,
10/21/01] Nothing more has been heard to confirm or deny the
hijackers' Philippines connections since these initial reports - are they being
downplayed to hide embarrassing connections between the hijackers, bin Laden's
family, and the Saudi government?
Early 2000: By the start of this year, the US
has already begun "to quietly build influence" in Central Asia. The
US has established significant military-to-military relationships with
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Soldiers from those countries have been
trained by Americans. The militaries of all three have an ongoing relationship
with the National Guard of a US state – Kazakhstan with Arizona,
Kyrgyzstan with Montana, Uzbekistan with Louisiana. The countries also
participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. [Washington
Post, 8/27/02]
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January
2000: Former President George Bush Sr. meets with the bin Laden family on behalf of the
Carlyle Group. He had also met with them in 1998 (see November 1998 (B)), but it's not
known if he met with them after this. Bush denied this
meeting took place until a thank you note was found confirming it. [Wall
Street Journal, 9/27/01, Guardian,
10/31/01] FTW
January 2000 (B): A DEA government document later leaked to the press [DEA report, 6/01]
suggests that a large Israeli spy ring starts penetrating the US from at least
this time, if not earlier. This ring, which will later become popularly
known as the "art student spy ring," is later shown to have strange
connections to the events of 9/11. [Insight,
3/11/02]
January-May 2000: 9/11
hijacker Atta is put under surveillance by the CIA while living in Germany. [AFP, 9/22/01,
Focus,
9/24/01, Berliner
Zeitung, 9/24/01] He is "reportedly observed buying large quantities
of chemicals in Frankfurt, apparently for the production of explosives [and/or]
for biological warfare. The US agents reported to have
trailed Atta are said to have failed to inform the German authorities about
their investigation," even as the Germans are investigating many of his
associates (see November 1, 1998-February 2001). "The
disclosure that Atta was being trailed by police long before 11 September
raises the question why the attacks could not have been prevented with the
man's arrest." [Observer,
9/30/01] A German newspaper adds that Atta was still able to get a visa into
the US on May 18. The surveillance stopped when he left for the US at the start
of June (see June 3, 2000). But "experts
believe that the suspect remained under surveillance in the United
States." [Berliner
Zeitung, 9/24/01] A German intelligence official also states, "We can
no longer exclude the possibility that the Americans wanted to keep an eye on
Atta after his entry in the USA." [Focus, 9/24/01]
This correlates with a Newsweek claim that US officials knew Atta was a
"known [associate] of Islamic terrorists well before [9/11]." [Newsweek, 9/20/01] However, a Congressional inquiry
later reports that the US "intelligence community possessed no
intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers
[including Atta] to terrorism or terrorist groups." [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Did the fact that the CIA started
monitoring Atta in January 2000 have any connection to roommate Ramzi bin
al-Shibh's participation in an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia, that the CIA had
ordered surveilled that same month (see January 5-8, 2000)?
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January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001: After being released from prison (see December
24-31, 1999), Saeed Sheikh stays in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for
several days and meets with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He also meets with bin
Laden, who is said to call Saeed "my special son." He then travels to
Pakistan and is given a house by the ISI. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02] He lives openly and opulently in Pakistan, even attending
"swanky parties attended by senior Pakistani government officials."
US authorities conclude he is an asset of the ISI. [Newsweek,
3/13/02] Amazingly, he is allowed to travel
freely to Britain, and visits family there at least twice (see 1999 (J)). [Vanity
Fair, 8/02] He works with Ijaz Shah, a former ISI
official in charge of handling two terrorist groups (see February
5, 2002), Lieutenant-General Mohammad Aziz Khan, former deputy chief
of the ISI in charge of relations with Jaish-e-Mohammad (see September 17-28, 2001 and October 7, 2001), and Brigadier
Abdullah, a former ISI officer. He is well known to other senior ISI officers.
He regularly travels to Afghanistan and helps train new terrorist recruits in
training camps there. [New
York Times, 2/25/02, National
Post, 2/26/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, India
Today, 2/25/02] Saeed helps train the 9/11 hijackers also, presumably in
Afghanistan. [Telegraph,
9/30/01] He also helps al-Qaeda develop a secure web-based communications
system, and there is even talk that he could one day succeed bin Laden. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02, Telegraph,
7/16/02] He wires money to the 9/11 hijackers on at least one occasion (see
Early
August 2001 (D)) and possibly others (see June
29, 2000-September 18, 2000 and September 8-11, 2001). Presumably
he sends the money from the United Arab Emirates during his many trips there. [Guardian,
2/9/02]
January 3,
2000: An al-Qaeda attack on USS The Sullivans in Yemen's Aden harbor fails
when their boat filled with explosives sinks. The attack remains undiscovered,
and a duplication of the attack by the same people later successfully hits the
USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). [PBS
Frontline 10/3/02]
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January
5-8, 2000: About a dozen of bin Laden's trusted
followers hold a secret, "top-level al-Qaeda summit" in the city of
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN,
8/30/02, San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS
Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11
attacks are discussed. [USA Today,
2/12/02, CNN,
8/30/02] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian secret service follows,
photographs, and even videotapes these men, and then passes the information on
to the US. However, the meeting is not
wiretapped. [Newsweek,
6/2/02, Ottawa
Citizen, 9/17/01, Observer,
10/7/01, CNN,
3/14/02, New
Yorker, 1/14/02] Attendees of the meeting include:
1 and 2) Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the
9/11 plot through these two hijackers and the knowledge of their presence at
this meeting.
3) Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged
"mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. [Independent,
6/6/02, CNN,
8/30/02] The US had known Mohammed was a major terrorist since the exposure
of Operation Bojinka in 1995 (see January 6, 1995 and January-May
1996), and knew what he looked like, as can be seen from a 1998
wanted poster (see Mid-1996-September
11, 2001). US officials have stated that they
only realized the meeting was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence
of Mohammed should have proved the meeting's importance. [Los Angeles
Times, 2/2/02]
4) An Indonesian terrorist known as Hambali. He was the main financier
of Operation Bojinka. [CNN,
8/30/02, CNN,
3/14/02] Philippine intelligence officials
learned of Hambali's importance in 1995, but didn't track him down or share
information about him. [CNN,
3/14/02]
5) Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian man who owned the condominium where the
meeting was held. [Newsweek,
6/2/02, Newsweek,
6/2/02] A possibility to expose the 9/11
plot through Sufaat's presence at this meeting is later missed (see September-October
2000).
6) Fahad al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through al-Quso's
presence at this meeting is later missed (see Early December 2000).
7) Tawifiq bin Atash, better known by his alias "Khallad."
Bin Atash, a "trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle," was
in charge of bin Laden's bodyguards, and served as bin Laden's personal
intermediary at least for the USS Cole attack. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Atash's
presence at this meeting is later missed (see January
4, 2001).
8) Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who investigators believe was supposed to be
the 20th hijacker, except he couldn't get a US visa. His presence at the
meeting may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite a picture of him
next to bin Atash, and even video footage of him. [Los
Angeles Times, 9/1/02, Time, 9/15/02
Die Zeit,
10/1/02, Newsweek,
11/26/01] One account says he was recognized
at the time of the meeting, which makes it hard to understand why he wasn't
tracked back to Germany. [Der
Spiegel, 10/1/02] Another possibility to expose the
9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh's presence at this meeting is later missed (see June
10, 2000). It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar were directly
involved in the attack on the USS Cole [Newsweek,
9/4/02, Washington
Post, 7/14/02, Guardian,
10/15/01], so better surveillance or
follow-up from this meeting should have prevented that attack as well.
9 and more?) Unnamed members of the Egyptian based Islamic Jihad were
also known to have been at the meeting. [Cox News,
10/21/01] Islamic Jihad had merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC
News, 11/17/01]
January
15, 2000: Shortly after the al-Qaeda meeting in
Malaysia, hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly from Bangkok,
Thailand, to Los Angeles, California. [MSNBC,
12/11/01] The CIA tracks Alhazmi, but
apparently doesn't realize Almihdhar is also on the plane. The US keeps a watch
list database known as TIPOFF, with over 80,000 names of suspected terrorists
as of late 2002. [Los Angeles
Times, 9/22/02] The list is checked whenever someone enters or leaves the
US. "The threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low," and even a
"reasonable suspicion" that a person is connected with a terrorist
group, warrants being added to the database. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Almihdhar and Alhazmi are important enough
to have been mentioned to the CIA Director several times this month, but are
not added to the watch list. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] Furthermore, "astonishingly, the CIA
... [didn't] notify the FBI, which could have covertly tracked them to find out
their mission." [Newsweek,
6/2/02]
January 15-August
2000: Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar return to their
apartment in San Diego, and live there openly. Hijacker Hani Hanjour joins them
as a roommate in February 2000. [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/21/01, San
Diego Channel 10, 9/18/01] They use their real names on their rental
agreement, [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] driver's licenses, Social Security cards
and credit cards, [Newsweek,
6/2/02] car purchase, and bank account. Alhazmi is even listed in the
2000-2001 San Diego phone book. [South
Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, Newsweek,
6/2/02] Neighbors notice odd behavior: they have no furniture, they are
constantly using cell phones on the balcony, constantly playing flight
simulator games, keep to themselves, and strange cars and limousines pick them
up for short rides in the middle of the night. [Washington
Post, 9/30/01, Time, 9/24/01]
Who were they meeting in these late night car rides, and for what purpose?
Mid-January
2000: Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who has been living in the US
for several years (see June 1998 (D)), throws a welcoming
party for future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in San Diego
that introduces them to the local Muslim community. [Washington
Post, 12/29/01] He also introduces hijacker Hani Hanjour to the community a
short time later. [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/14/02] One associate later says an al-Bayoumi party
"was a big deal ... it meant that everyone accepted them without
question." [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 10/25/01] This was only a small part of his assistance
to the three hijackers (see November
1999 (B)). Why was he so friendly and helpful? Many people in
San Diego who knew him believe he was a Saudi government spy, reporting on the
activities of Saudi-born college students. [San
Diego Union-Tribune, 9/14/02, Newsweek,
11/22/02]
February 6, 2000: India's largest newsweekly reports that it appears a recent
Mossad attempt to infiltrate al-Qaeda failed when they were stopped by Indian
customs officials on their way to Bangladesh. These 11 men appeared to be from
Afghanistan, but had Israeli passports. One expert states, "It is not
unlikely for Mossad to recruit 11 Afghans in Iran and grant them Israeli
citizenship to penetrate a network such as Bin Laden's. They would begin by
infiltrating them into an Islamic radical group in an unlikely place like
Bangladesh." [The
Week, 2/6/00] If this shows that Mossad was trying to infiltrate
al-Qaeda, did they make other attempts that succeeded, and if so, is this how
they learned enough to know where to trail al-Qaeda in the US via the "art
student spy ring"?
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February 23, 2000: European
Parliament hearings over Echelon, the global surveillance network, draw banner
headlines across Europe. A report prepared for the European Parliament not only
confirms that Echelon exists, but has found that Echelon had twice helped US
companies gain an advantage over Europeans. The EU sets up a commission to
determine if action should be taken against Britain for security breaches. [New
York Times, 2/24/00] The US has denied and continues to
deny the very existence of Echelon. But it exists, as Echelon partners Britain
and Australia (see November 3, 1999) now admit. [BBC, 5/29/01]
March 2000: An FBI agent, reportedly angry over a glitch in an e-mail
tracking program that has somehow mixed innocent non-targeted e-mails with
those belonging to al-Qaeda, supposedly accidentally destroys all of the FBI's Denver-based
intercepts of bin Laden's colleagues in a terrorist investigation. The tracking
program is called Carnivore. But the story sounds
dubious, and is flatly contradicted in the same article: "A Justice
Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Tuesday night
that the e-mails were not destroyed." [AP, 5/28/02] FTW
March
2000 (B): US intelligence obtains information
about the types of targets that bin Laden’s network might strike. The
Statue of Liberty is specially mentioned, as are skyscrapers, ports, airports,
and nuclear power plants. [Senate
Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]
March 5, 2000: An
unnamed nation tells the CIA that hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi had flown from the
January meeting in Malaysia to Los Angeles (see January 5-8, 2000). [New
York Times, 10/17/02] This confirms what the CIA already knows. [CNN,
3/02] The CIA also learns that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar arrived in the US
on the same flight. [Michael
Rolince Testimony, 9/20/02] Yet again, CIA fails to put their
names on a watch list, and fails to alert the FBI so they can be tracked. [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] CIA Director Tenet later claims that
"Nobody read that cable in the March timeframe." [New York Times,
10/17/02] Yet the Congressional inquiry report
states that the day after the cable was received, "another overseas CIA
station noted, in a cable to the bin Laden unit at CIA headquarters, that it
had 'read with interest' the March cable, 'particularly the information that a
member of this group traveled to the US...'" [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02]
March 17, 2000: Reports
suggest bin Laden appears weak and gaunt at an important meeting of supporters.
He may be very ill with liver ailments, and is seeking a kidney dialysis
machine. [AP,
3/25/00] It is believed he gets the dialysis machine in early 2001. [London
Times, 11/01/01] He is able to talk, walk with a cane, and hold meetings,
but little else. [Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, 3/16/00, Asiaweek,
3/24/00] If bin Laden had such medical trouble before 9/11, how could he
stay alive on the run after 9/11?
March 21,
2000: FBI agent Robert Wright (see also October 1998 and June 9, 2001), having been accused
of tarnishing the reputation of fellow agent Gamal Abdel-Hafiz, makes a formal
internal complaint about Abdel-Hafiz. FBI agent Barry Carmody seconds Wright's
complaint. Wright and Carmody accuse Abdel-Hafiz, a Muslim, of hindering
investigations by openly refusing to record other Muslims. The FBI was investigating if BMI Inc., a New Jersey based
company with connections to Saudi financier Yassin al-Qadi (see October 12, 2002), had helped fund
the 1998 US embassy bombings. [Wall
Street Journal, 11/26/02, ABC
News, 12/19/02] Federal prosecutor Mark Flessner and other FBI
agents back up the allegations against Abdel-Hafiz. [ABC
News, 12/19/02] Carmody also claims that Abdel-Hafiz hurt an inquiry into
the possible terrorist ties of fired University of South Florida Professor Sami
Al-Arian by refusing to record a conversation with the professor in 1998. [Tampa
Tribune, 3/4/03] Complaints to superiors and
headquarters about this never get a response. [Fox News,
3/6/03] Furthermore, "Far from being reprimanded, Abdel-Hafiz [is]
promoted to one of the FBI's most important anti-terrorism posts, the American
Embassy in Saudi Arabia, to handle investigations for the FBI in that Muslim
country." [ABC
News, 12/19/02] Abdel-Hafiz is finally suspended in February 2003 after his
scandal is widely reported in the press. [Tampa
Tribune, 3/4/03] Bill O'Reilly of Fox News claims that on March 4, 2003,
the FBI threatens to fire Wright if he speaks publicly about this, one hour
before Wright is scheduled to appear on Fox News. [Fox News,
3/4/03] Is Abdel-Hafiz promoted to a sensitive Saudi post because he
won't ask hard questions there?
March 25, 2000: President Clinton visits Pakistan. It is later revealed that
the US secret service believed that the ISI was so deeply infiltrated by
terrorist organizations, that it begged Clinton to cancel his visit.
Specifically, the US government determined that the ISI had long standing ties
with al-Qaeda. When Clinton went ahead anyway, his security took extraordinary
and unprecedented precautions. For instance, an empty Air Force One was flown
into the country, and the president made the trip in a small unmarked plane. [New
York Times, 10/29/01]
Spring
2000: German investigators finally agree to the CIA's idea of recruiting
businessman Mamoun Darkazanli as an informer (see December 1999 and September 24, 2001). An agent of
the LFV, the Hamburg state intelligence agency, casually approaches Darkazanli
and asks him whether he is interested in becoming a spy. Darkazanli replies that he is just a businessman who knows
nothing about al-Qaeda or terrorism. The Germans inform the local CIA
representative that the approach failed. The CIA agent refuses to admit defeat.
But when German agents ask for more information to show Darkazanli they know of
his terrorist ties, the CIA fails to give any information. As it happened, at
the end of January 2000, Darkazanli had just met with terrorist Barakat Yarkas
in Madrid, Spain. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02] Darkazanli is a long-time friend and
business partner of Yarkas, the most prominent al-Qaeda agent in Spain. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/14/03] The meeting included other suspected al-Qaeda
figures, and was monitored by Spanish police. If the CIA was aware of the
Madrid meeting, they don't tell the Germans. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02] The CIA had also begun surveillance of Atta in January
2000, but they keep all knowledge of that investigation secret from the Germans
(see January-May 2000). A second LFV attempt to recruit
Darkazanli also fails. The CIA then attempts to work with federal German
intelligence officials in Berlin to "turn" Darkazanli. Results of
that effort aren't known. [Chicago
Tribune, 11/17/02]
Spring 2000 (B): Investigative reporter Bob Woodward later claims that special
CIA paramilitary teams begin "working with tribes and warlords in southern
Afghanistan" and help "create a significant new network in the region
of the Taliban's greatest strength." [Washington
Post, 11/18/01]
Spring
2000 (C): Sources who know bin Laden later
claim that bin Laden's stepmother has a second meeting with her son Osama in
Afghanistan (see Spring 1998). The trip is approved
by the Saudi royal family. The Saudis pass the message to him that "'they
wouldn't crack down on his followers in Saudi Arabia' as long as he set his
sights on targets outside the desert kingdom." In late 1999, the Saudi government had told the CIA about the
upcoming trip, and suggested placing a homing beacon on her luggage. This
doesn't happen - Saudis later claim they weren't taken seriously, and Americans
claim they never received specific information on her travel plans. [New Yorker,
11/5/01, Washington
Post, 12/19/01]
Spring 2000 (D): Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, while living in San Diego, contacts a "terrorist facility" in the Middle East that is under US surveillance (see